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THESIS ABSTRACT 
 
William Brent Chastain 
 
Master of Science 
 
Department of Political Science 
 
June 2012 
 
Title: The Iraq War and the Post Vietnam Narrative: Culture and Change in the U.S. 
Army, 2005-2007 
 
 
The Iraq War was an era of crisis and change within the U.S. Army.  The failure of 
the army to adapt to the war revealed the obsolescence of post Vietnam army culture.  
Innovation experiences in the war were directionless and a new intellectual framework was 
required to deal with warfare that the army had long disliked: counterinsurgency.  Major 
organizational change was accomplished by a coalition of generals led by Generals David 
Petraeus, Jack Keane, and Ray Odierno. These officers established a new intellectual 
framework with FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency.  They challenged institutional military 
orthodoxy in Washington by proposing a renewed commitment to victory. Finally, they 
demonstrated the efficacy of counterinsurgency theory through a military campaign that 
“proved” FM 3-24.  This major, yet limited, change in service culture fractured the 
consensus of the post Vietnam narrative and initiated an ongoing reinterpretation of the 
army’s philosophy of war. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE U.S. ARMY IN IRAQ, 2005-2007 
 
It was like the debate of a group of savages as to how to extract a screw from a piece of         
wood.  Accustomed only to nails, they had made one effort to pull out the screw by  main 
force, and now that it had failed they were devising methods of obtaining more efficient 
pincers, of using levers and fulcrums so that more men could bring their strength to bear.  
They could hardly be blamed for not guessing that by rotating the screw it would come 
out after the exertion of far less effort; it would be a notion so different from anything 
they had ever encountered that they would have laughed at the man who suggested it.1 
 
 Essentially this is a narrative about change.  The events in the Iraq War associated 
with the 2007 “Surge” of 30,000 additional U.S. troops and the adoption of a 
comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy under the leadership of General David 
Petraeus was a major transformational event for the U.S. Army.  The relative success in 
2007 of this shift in tactics and strategy2 to rescue the overall U.S. war effort was an 
accomplishment that was widely believed to be impossible.  In fact, an understanding of 
                                                 
1
 C.S. Forrester, The General (Charleston, South Carolina: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company 
of America, 2005), 195-196. A description of British WWI generals trying to devise ever more rigid 
command and control arrangements and using more and more firepower in larger assaults to break the 
stalemate on the Western Front in 1918. 
 
2
 Throughout this work I will use the terms “tactics” and “strategy” often.  However, I will not be using the 
strict U.S. military definition of the three levels of war (strategic, operational, tactical) as I believe that 
these rigid and somewhat artificial definitions obscure as much as they enlighten.  The levels of war are a 
theoretical “levels of analysis” tool for understanding the different aspects of war.  This tool artificially 
divides war into three categories, simply described as: 1. the strategic level- fighting wars, 2. the 
operational level- military campaigns (unified collections of battles), and 3. the tactical level- battles or 
engagements.  However, this theoretical construct is often misunderstood as an objective reality and not an 
analytical tool.  Therefore, when I use the term “tactical” I will generally mean the lower level of the army 
that actually engages in combat: the brigade-level and below.  More specifically, when I refer to the tactical 
level of the army as an organization I mean all officers below general officer rank.  When I use “strategic” 
it will refer to higher level grouping of tactics for military or political goals as well as to general officers as 
a group.  I will infrequently use the term “operational” as a level of war, but I will refer to campaign 
planning and execution.  It is not my intent to form any restrictive definitions of strategy and tactics as 
these concepts overlap and interact in significant ways that limit the utility of strict definitions.  For more 
on this see Michael Handel’s Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought, 33-40, 353-360. 
 2 
the preferences and values of the army would have predicted the inability of the U.S. 
Army to prevail in this inherently political counterinsurgency war.   
 Particularly since the end of the Vietnam War, the U.S. Army has been 
uncomfortable with ambiguous, limited wars.  Army leaders in the post Vietnam era 
sought to refocus the service on straight-forward forms of war that conformed to the 
understood strength of American arms.  The Second World War provided the 
paradigmatic “good” war in this conception as it was fought for clear objectives, the 
entire country was mobilized for the war effort, and it operated on an unlimited industrial 
scale of manpower, technology, and firepower.  This idea became deeply ingrained in the 
army in the 1980s and was not even dislodged by the massive changes at the end of the 
Cold War.  This cultural dynamic was clearly at work during the first years of the Iraq 
War in which the army was ill-prepared for the complicated requirements of an 
occupying army fighting multiple insurgencies.            
 In light of the cultural reluctance of the army to accept the requirements of a 
counterinsurgency war, how and why did the shift in U.S. approach in 2007 occur?  
Many different interpretations of the Iraq War are available with explanations for the 
relative success of the surge that vary in the extremes from solely crediting local Iraqi 
factors to solely crediting U.S. military action.  What all of these explanations lack is an 
understanding of the organizational dynamics of the U.S. Army in this conflict. 
Innovation and “organizational learning” are often cited as explanations for the improved 
performance in the Iraq War.  Conversely, arguments are made that President Bush or 
General Petraeus simply imposed a new strategy on the army and subsequently 
performance improved.  Yet these explanations both ignore the facts that not all tactical 
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level units engaged in uniform or progressive adaptation and that a major operational 
shift is not achieved in a large and ponderous organization like the army by a senior 
leader simply throwing a switch.  
 In the Iraq War two distinct yet interrelated forms of organizational change were 
playing themselves out within the army.  The first form of change was an internal debate 
about the specific requirements for tactical and strategic success in the Iraq War, while 
the second was a fundamental reinterpretation of the army’s dominant philosophy of war. 
These changes were driven by a convergence and interaction of internal organizational 
dynamics.  From the bottom-level of the army varying examples of innovation, 
adaptation, and retrenchment were exhibited by rank-and-file officers in the Iraq War.  
These attempts at innovation, both successful and unsuccessful were directionless and 
dissonance was experienced by these officers between the reality that they faced on the 
ground in Iraq and what the dominant military strategy required.    
 From the top level of the organization a coalition of like-minded generals formed 
and offered a new intellectual framework for conceptualizing the war predicated on 
achieving military victory rather than withdrawal.  This new framework intentionally 
addressed the dissonance experienced by junior officers and provided a conceptual path 
to success in the war.  Hence, the specific changes achieved by the army in 2007 were the 
result of an interaction between elements at the top and the bottom of the army and a 
convergence of factors external to the organization.  This new framework challenged the 
organizational consensus that had formed in the post Vietnam era about the purpose of 
the army.  While these developments in the Iraq War did not overturn the well-
established dominant cultural narrative, they opened this dominant philosophy up to 
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reinterpretation.   In a process that is much less decisive or clear-cut than the more 
narrow changes concerned with the specifics of the Iraq War, a long-term and highly 
ambiguous reinterpretation of the dominant cultural narrative was set in motion by the 
changes associated with the Surge.   
 It would have been an easy decision for the U.S. Army, in line with post-Vietnam 
thinking about politics and war, to have simply continued the established strategy in Iraq 
that would probably have led to the disintegration of the Iraqi state or an ongoing civil 
war.  This strategic failure could have been easily blamed on the many failures of the 
Bush Administration regarding Iraq and allowed the U.S. Army to reject 
counterinsurgency missions in favor of more comfortable conventional ones.  It is not 
difficult to imagine how this failure could have reinforced the ideas of the post Vietnam 
era and settled the question of the ability of the military to conduct messy political wars 
once and for all.  However, this version of organizational path dependency or doctrinal 
stasis did not occur.  In 2007 a strategic shift was made in the operations, and more 
importantly, in the thinking of the U.S. Army.  While the “Surge myth” of the unilateral 
nature of U.S. success in Iraq in 2007 and 2008 is certainly overblown, so are the 
counter-claims that the Surge was merely a confluence of events or just luck.   
 This work seeks to explore the specific and general dynamics of organizational 
change in the U.S. Army during the Iraq War by understanding its organizational culture 
and how it changed during this crisis and over the longer-term.  The first section begins 
with an analysis of the most prominent explanations of the Surge from the sizeable Iraq 
War literature.  The next section details the historical and cultural context of the U.S. 
Army with an account of the formation of the dominant cultural narrative in the years 
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after the Vietnam War.  Following this is an analysis of the convergence and interaction 
of the experiences of rank-and-file officers in the Iraq War with the activities of different 
groups of senior officers.   In conclusion, the similarities and differences between the Iraq 
War and Vietnam War eras are discussed as well as the prospects for long-term 
institutional change in the army.  
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CHAPTER II 
THE IRAQ WAR “SURGE” 
 
“Iraq made fools out of just about everyone”3  
 
A.  The Surge Literature 
 The “Surge”4 of U.S. military forces in 2007 is commonly understood to have 
“snatched victory from the jaws of defeat” in the Iraq War.5  This conventional wisdom 
holds that success resulted from the combination of the political will of President George 
W. Bush, the military genius of General David Petraeus, and additional U.S. troops in 
Baghdad armed with better counterinsurgency tactics.6 Alternate accounts of the dramatic 
decrease in violence focus on individual causal factors.  Journalists Patrick Cockburn and 
Nir Rosen argue that the completion of the Shia ethnic cleansing of Baghdad, in effect a 
Shia victory in the sectarian civil war of 2006 and 2007, led to the decrease in violence.  
U.S. Army colonel Gian Gentile argues that the U.S. had been conducting 
counterinsurgency tactics well before 2007 and that the real cause of success was the 
                                                 
3
 Micheal J. Totten, In the Wake of the Surge (Portland, Oregon: Belmont Estate Books, 2011), 13. 
 
4
 Henceforth, I will dispense with capitalizing, italicizing, or placing quotation marks around the term 
“surge.”  Whenever this term appears it refers to the 2007 deployment of approximately 30,000 additional 
troops to Iraq and General David Petraeus’ assumption of command of Multi National Forces Iraq and all 
associated changes. 
 
5
 Steven Metz, Decisionmaking in Operation Iraqi Freedom: The Strategic Shift of 2007 (Carlisle Barracks 
PA: U.S. Army War College, 2010), 5. 
  
6
 David Howell Petraeus, “Getting the Big Ideas Right: The Strategic Concepts That Helped Achieve 
Substantial Progress in Iraq” (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 2008).; Raymond T. Odierno, “The 
Surge in Iraq: One Year Later” (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 2008).; Metz.; and Yochi J. 
Dreazen, “Officer Questions Petraeus's Strategy: Iraq War Veteran Says Focus on Counterinsurgency 
Hinders Ability to Fight Conventional War,” Wall Street Journal April 7, 2008  
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120753402909694027.html (accessed November 17, 2011).  
 7 
hiring of hundreds of thousands of Sunni militiamen during the Sunni Awakening.7  
Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward asserts that the casualties caused by relentless 
targeting of mid and senior level Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) leaders by U.S. special 
operations forces exhausted the Sunni insurgency.8  Another explanation of the surge 
focuses on the “confluence” of multiple factors that led to success.  Strategic analyst 
Steven Metz argues this position by describing the surge as a “perfect storm” of “good 
thinking, good luck, and good timing.” This explanation describes Iraqi civilians tiring of 
sectarian strife, Iraqi Security Forces making limited improvements in performance, and 
U.S. forces practicing better counterinsurgency tactics as the main causes of reductions in 
violence. 9   
 Other observers such as Bing West10 and retired Australian army officer and 
counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen, emphasize the importance of the “tribal 
revolt” in Anbar province against AQI as critical to the success of the surge.11  Generals 
David Petraeus and Ray Odierno, the two officers most closely associated with the surge 
in Iraq, have not denied the confluence of factors, but highlight the importance of both 
“forces and ideas.”  They include the signal of commitment by the U.S., additional troops 
                                                 
7
 Dreazen.; and  Gian Gentile, “Misreading the Surge Threatens U.S. Conventional Capabilities.” World 
Politics Review March 4, 2008 http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/1715/misreading-the-surge-
threatens-u-s-armys-conventional-capabilities (accessed November 13, 2011). 
 
8
 Bob Woodward, “Why Did Violence Plummet? It Wasn't Just the Surge.” Washington Post September 8, 
2008 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/07/AR2008090701847.html  
(accessed November 10, 2011). 
 
9
 Metz, iv. 
 
10
 Francis J. West, The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq (New York: Random 
House, 2008). 
 
11
 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), 115-185. 
 8 
to secure the Baghdad area, creation of additional Iraqi forces, the Sunni Awakening, 
systematic counterinsurgency tactics, and the overall military commitment to secure the 
civilian population as the critical factors in the tactical and strategic success of the 
surge.12  It is also significant to note that with the exception of the political memoirs of 
senior Bush administration officials,13 not a single commentator argues that the surge 
achieved a strategic victory.  Former Washington Post military affairs correspondent, 
Thomas E. Ricks stated that, “The surge campaign was effective in many ways, but the 
best grade it can be given is a solid incomplete.  It succeeded tactically but fell short 
strategically.”14  Kilcullen declared that, “The Surge worked: but in the final analysis, it 
was an effort to save ourselves from the more desperate consequences of a situation we 
should never have gotten ourselves into.”15   
 While there are many different interpretations of the U.S. surge of forces in the 
Iraq War, a “dominant debate” has more or less coalesced around two sets of general 
narratives of the war.  Historian and retired army colonel Andrew Bacevich characterized 
the literature of the Iraq War as being divided into two general categories: “The first 
category, dominated by journalistic observers, indicts.  The second category, authored by 
insider participants, acquits.”16 The literature on the surge has matured somewhat since 
                                                 
12
 Petraeus, “Getting the Big Ideas Right”; and Odierno. 
 
13
 George W. Bush, Decision Points (New York: Crown Publishers, 2010).; Richard B. Cheney and Liz 
Cheney,  In My Time: A Personal and Political Memoir (New York: Threshold Editions, 2011).; Donald 
Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir (New York: Sentinel, 2011).; and Condoleezza Rice, No 
Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington (New York: Crown Publishers, 2011).  
 
14
 Thomas E. Ricks, The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 
2006-2008 (New York: Penguin Press, 2009), 296. 
 
15Kilcullen, 185.  
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Bacevich made this critique in 2007, but his description is useful in understanding the 
dominant debate on the surge and the reasons for its success.  By broadening Bacevich’s 
conception to include the broad strands of arguments running through the writings on the 
Iraq War a clearer picture of the surge begins to emerge.  The first category of argument 
is best captured by Tom Ricks in The Gamble: General Petraeus and the American 
Military Adventure in Iraq.  The second general category is captured by a combination of 
works by journalist Nir Rosen, strategic analyst Steven Metz, and Colonel Gian Gentile.  
The discussion of the dominant debate in the literature will be followed by an 
examination of the most unique and divergent explanations offered in other parts of the 
literature, concluding with general and specific gaps in the literature.   
B.  The Dominant Debate:  “Confluence” vs. “Timing” 
 The dominant debate over the success of the surge in Iraq, 2007 is composed of a 
“confluence” argument and a “timing” argument.  The “confluence” position maintains 
that U.S. political and military commitment to Iraq in manpower and resources, changes 
in military strategy, and a tactical commitment to population security all coincided with 
fortuitous events on the ground in Iraq leading to the drop in violence in Iraq in mid-
2007.  The “timing” argument holds that primarily developments on the ground in Iraq 
caused the decreased levels of violence associated with the surge.  The completion of 
ethnic cleansing of mixed-sect Baghdad neighborhoods, the disintegration of Jaysh al-
Mahdi and Muqtada al-Sadr’s unilateral ceasefire with U.S. forces, and the tribal 
backlash against Al Qaeda in Iraq in Anbar province,  all allowed the shift in U.S. 
                                                                                                                                                 
16
 Andrew J. Bacevich, “Fault Lines: Inside Rumsfeld’s Pentagon,” Boston Review July 2008  
http://bostonreview.net/BR33.4/bacevich.php (accessed  November 19, 2011). 
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strategy and tactics to be effective.  Simply stated, this is a debate about causality: the 
confluence advocates argue that the U.S. surge caused, or at least enabled, the decrease in 
violence while the timing advocates argue that developments on the ground allowed new 
U.S. efforts to reinforce the preexisting downward trend in violence. 
     Confluence 
 The most influential work of the surge literature is Tom Ricks’ The Gamble.  
With his long experience observing and writing about the U.S. military for the 
Washington Post and the Wall Street Journal, Ricks had extensive access to senior 
political and military leaders in Washington, D.C. and Iraq, as well as a web of 
connections with junior army and marine officers in the field.  This work best typifies the 
“confluence” argument: a combination of factors led to the success of the surge, but the 
most important factor was the introduction of additional U.S. troops, with new dynamic 
senior leadership and armed with comprehensive counterinsurgency tactics and hard-won 
combat experience.  Since Ricks has essentially framed the conventional narrative of the 
surge, at least in the U.S., his argument deserves to be analyzed in detail.   
 Ricks identified five reasons for the success of the surge: 
  1. The forward presence of U.S. troops secured Iraqi population centers.  
  2. The completion of ethnic cleansing in Baghdad.     
  3. Muqtada al-Sadr’s declared aceasefire with U.S. forces.     
  4. The “unity of effort” achieved by General Petraeus and Ambassador  
   Crocker’s integrated political-military strategy with General  
   Odierno’s “coordinated and…synchronized” military campaign  
   plan with counterinsurgency tactics.                 
  5.  The turning of parts of the Sunni insurgency associated with the  
   Anbar Awakening movement.       
                         
 11 
The surge is described as a significant, yet narrow, military success.  The surge managed 
to achieve a reduction in violence, but failed to settle the political situation in Iraq and 
guarantee a long term strategic victory for the United States.  The success of the surge is 
generally credited to the U.S. military adopting population security tactics, having 
learned from four difficult years of war, the right leaders taking command in Iraq, and 
sufficient desperation taking hold within the Bush Administration to allow this new team 
to accomplish its mission free of interference.17  The recent memoirs of President Bush, 
Vice President Cheney, and Secretary of State Rice all reinforce the general narrative that 
Ricks established, stressing the importance of General Petraeus and his new 
counterinsurgency doctrine, the importance of the Anbar Awakening, and emphasizing 
the space bought by the U.S. military for national political reconciliation in Iraq.18  
 Linda Robinson’s Tell Me How This Ends and David Cloud and Greg Jaffe’s The 
Fourth Star share Ricks’ general “confluence” conception and put even more emphasis 
on the skill and genius of General David Petraeus as the critical ingredient in the success 
of the surge.  Robinson stated that the combination of the efforts of 170,000 U.S. troops, 
Ambassador Crocker and thousands of diplomats, and hundreds of thousands of Iraqis, 
“pulled Iraq back from the brink of civil war,” but she stipulated that, “without a doubt, 
Petraeus was the instrumental figure in obtaining the successes.”  Both works highlight 
the intellectual, leadership, and personality traits of General Petraeus that made him the 
ideal commander for the desperate straits the U.S. found itself in 2007.19  
                                                 
17
 Ricks, The Gamble, 9, 156, 160, 165, 173, 201, 203 223, 296. 
 
18
 Bush, 365, 377, 385.; Cheney, 463.; and Rice, 592-593, 598. 
 
 12 
 A Brookings Institution report authored by Stephen Biddle, Michael O’Hanlon, 
and Kenneth Pollack offered a slightly different explanation of the surge, but one that 
was in general agreement with the Ricks narrative.  Biddle et al., narrow the causal 
factors of the decreased violence to two: 1. the U.S. military’s adoption of population 
security tactics, and 2. the addition of the surge army and marine forces into Baghdad and 
Anbar Province.  These forces and tactics allowed Petraeus to take advantage of the 
“Sunni Realignment” in Anbar, to continue pressuring Jaysh al-Mahdi and other Shia 
extremist groups, and to “surge” Iraqi Security Forces in concert with U.S. forces.20  In 
this conception, the U.S. surge of forces with new tactics, made all other political and 
military progress in Iraq possible; enabling the survival and spread of the Anbar 
Awakening to other parts of Iraq and breaking the grip of Shia militias on the Shia 
populace by removing their justification for existence.21   
 The primary U.S. military participants in the planning and execution of the surge, 
retired General Jack Keane, General David Petraeus, General Ray Odierno, and special 
political advisor Emma Sky,22 all supported the confluence narrative in various articles, 
speeches, and interviews.  Keane emphasized the combination of “classic 
                                                                                                                                                 
19
 Linda Robinson, Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq 
(New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2008), 345-348.; and David Cloud and Greg Jaffe, The Fourth Star: Four 
Generals and the Epic Struggle for the Future of the United States Army (New York: Crown Publishing, 
2009), 257, 260, 278 .  
 
20
 Stephen Biddle, Michael O’Hanlon, and Kenneth M. Pollack. “The Evolution of Iraq Strategy” in 
Restoring the Balance: A Middle East Strategy for the Next President, ed. Richard N. Haas (Washington, 
DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 33.  For an updated version of this argument see Stephen Biddle, 
Jeffrey A. Friedman and Jacob N. Shapiro’s, “Testing the Surge: Why did Violence Decline in 2007?” 
http://www.princeton.edu/~jns/papers/BFS_2012_Testing_the_Surge.pdf (accessed May 11, 2012).   
 
21
 Biddle, O’Hanlon, and Pollack, 31-32, 39-42. 
 
22
 Emma Sky, a British Foreign Office official with extensive experience in the Middle East,  served in the 
CPA in Kirkuk and later as General Odierno and General Petraeus’ special political advisor for Iraq. Emma 
Sky, "Iraq 2007 - Moving Beyond Counter-Insurgency Doctrine" RUSI Journal. 153, no. 2 (2008), 31. 
 13 
counterinsurgency tactics” to protect the population with Iraqi civilian exhaustion from 
the sectarian conflict as the key factors of success.  Echoing Biddle et al., he argued that 
U.S. forces, tactics, and renewed commitment to Iraqi security made the Sons of Iraq 
movement and the Jaysh al-Mahdi ceasefire happen, and not the reverse.23  General 
Petraeus emphasized that, “the most important surge in Iraq was not the surge of forces; 
rather it was the surge of ideas that guided the employment of our forces…”24 
 General Odierno reinforced this concept with his explanation of the surge as a 
coordinated, offensive military operation to provide real security to the people of Iraq by 
breaking the cycle of violence caused by inter-community sectarian violence.  According 
to Odierno this new mindset was demonstrated through:  
  1. A full-time commitment to population security through dispersed U.S.  
   combat outposts, checkpoints to stop death squads, and barriers to  
   block car bombers.                                                  
   2.  An Iraqi government approved “balanced” targeting of both Sunni and 
   Shia extremists.                                                                                                                                        
  3. A renewed partnership with the Iraqi Security Forces with more   
   advising teams and direct partnering between U.S. and Iraqi  
   tactical units.                    
  4.  A coordinated campaign to control the central districts of Baghdad and  
   clear extremist support zones on the outskirts of the city.                                               
  5.  Integration of political and military goals in planning and execution  
   between U.S. military and civilian agencies with the government  
   of Iraq.25 
  Finally, Emma Sky highlighted the importance of the pragmatic leadership of 
Generals Petraeus and Odierno.  For the first time in the Iraq War the senior military 
commanders engaged in a comprehensive effort to truly understand the nature of the 
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problem in Iraq, which by late 2006 had evolved from multiple insurgencies into large 
scale ethno-sectarian strife.26  With a clear understanding of the problem, the U.S. was 
able to craft a coherent strategy, adopt appropriate tactics, and take advantage of Iraqi 
developments such as the Anbar Awakening and the fracturing of Jaysh al-Mahdi to 
foster political reconciliation. 27 
 While the various sources cited in this section may disagree on the specific causes 
of the decrease in violence, or about the relative importance of certain factors, they all 
agree that a variety of factors were at play.  The confluence argument is an essentially 
U.S. military-centric explanation that describes the surge as causing, enabling, and taking 
advantage of fortuitous developments on the ground in Iraq.28  The core of this argument 
is that none of the 2007 reductions in violence in Iraq would have been possible without 
the leadership of General Petraeus, new population-centric counterinsurgency tactics, and 
the addition of approximately 30,000 U.S. troops.  General Odierno summarized this 
position by stating,  
 It’s tempting for those of us personally connected to the events to exaggerate the 
 efforts of the surge.  By the same token, it’s a gross oversimplification to 
 say…that the positive trends we’re observing have come about because we paid 
 off the Sunni insurgents or because Muqtada al-Sadr simply decided to announce 
 a ceasefire.  These assertions ignore the key variable in the equation- the 
 Coalition’s change in strategy and our employment of the surge forces.29 
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Timing 
 The opposing argument to the U.S. military-centric confluence school can best be 
described as concerned with the “timing” of developments on the ground in Iraq.  In this 
view, the U.S. surge succeeded because of conditions and trends in Iraq that predated the 
early 2007 surge of U.S. forces.  The three most prominent proponents of this position are 
strategic analyst Steven Metz, journalist and long-time Middle East observer Nir Rosen, 
and Iraq War veteran and current director of West Point’s History Department, Colonel 
Gian Gentile.  Factors such as the Sunni tribal backlash against Al Qaeda in Iraq, the 
splintering of the Shia militias, U.S. tactical improvements based on experience, and the 
hardening of sectarian boundaries as a result of civil war were all cited to explain the 
2007 decrease in violence with U.S. forces playing only a minor role. 
 While Metz first used the term confluence to describe the array of factors that 
contributed the success of the surge, his monograph Decision Making in Operation Iraqi 
Freedom: The Strategic Shift of 2007, clearly argues that any “success” attributed to the 
surge was based on developments in the Iraqi political and security environment and not 
primarily from U.S. action.  He acknowledged that the U.S. lacked a clear national 
strategy for Iraq and didn’t have a comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign plan until 
2004.  However, by 2005 a strategy emerged based on Generals Abizaid and Casey’s 
understanding of the growing insurgency.  This plan to increase the size and capabilities 
of the Iraqi Security Forces and rapidly transfer security responsibility to Iraqis was 
based on the counterinsurgency principle that, “outsiders can influence” but only “locals 
can decide.”  Metz contended that this strategy was appropriate to the environment of 
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2005, but was clearly failing in 2006 because of the ethno-sectarian civil war that was 
occurring in concert with the anti-occupation insurgency. 30 
 For Metz, “The popular perception…that the strategic shift of 2007…snatched 
victory from imminent defeat.” is too simplistic to capture the complex reality of the 
situation in Iraq.  This “surge myth” ignored that U.S. strategy in 2005 was wholly 
appropriate, that the situation fundamentally changed in 2006 with the sectarian civil war, 
and that, “The strategic shift of 2007 succeeded through a combination of good thinking, 
good luck, and good timing.” Metz differs most significantly from Gentile and Rosen in 
his description of the role of key U.S. decision makers reacting to the security situation in 
Iraq.  While they all agree on the importance of Iraqi factors in explaining the 2007 
decrease in violence, Metz clearly sees the critical factor of the surge success as the key 
decision maker, President George Bush, taking decisive action to: 1. remove the root 
cause of general dissonance in U.S. Iraq strategy - Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, 2.  
remove the principal advocate of a failing strategy - General George Casey, and 3.  adopt 
a strategy and leadership that was appropriate to the current situation in Iraq - General 
Petraeus and his “counterinsurgency support plus peacekeeping.”31   
 Timing is the critically important factor in the tactical success of the surge.  The 
shift of 2007 could not have succeeded even a year earlier; it was an appropriate strategy 
for its time and place.  Neither Sunni nor Shia communities would have tolerated the 
persistent presence of U.S. forces in their communities without the “exhausting” 
experience of the 2006 sectarian conflict.  This exhaustion was particularly acute for the 
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Sunni communities as they suffered at the hands of the U.S. military, Shia-dominated 
Iraqi Security Forces, Shia militias, and, finally, from their own erstwhile defenders - Al 
Qaeda in Iraq. This dynamic was described by Metz as the “perfect storm” of trends and 
conditions that enabled the U.S. to take advantage of: 1. changes in Sunni Arab attitudes, 
2. experimental population security tactics pioneered by the U.S. Army and Marine 
Corps, and 3. the splintering of the Jaysh al-Mahdi and Muqtada al-Sadr’s ceasefire.  Just 
as the Sunni and Shia communities had to endure the crucible of the sectarian civil war to 
reach limited reconciliation, the U.S. military had to experience the full range of 
difficulties and failures of the Iraq War from 2004 until 2007 to become effective 
counterinsurgents.   By virtue of its structure, training, and preference, the U.S. Army of 
2005 was incapable of conducting the counterinsurgency campaign of 2007.  Metz 
concluded that the current evidence of the Iraq War does not support the assertion that 
U.S. strategy was ineffective before 2007. The surge, “capitalized on a temporary and 
volatile combination of trends and conditions.  It was the right approach at the right 
time.”32  
 Nir Rosen and Gian Gentile offer reinforcing arguments for the decrease of 
violence in 2007.  Both reject the idea that the surge was a successful U.S. military 
operation that “saved” Iraq; Rosen characterized it as “An Ugly Peace”33 and Gentile as a 
“myth.”34   These authors come to similar conclusions from different perspectives and for 
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vastly different reasons.  Rosen, an Iranian-American and fluent Arabic speaker, 
witnessed the war in Iraq and the wider Middle East first-hand through his ability to 
blend in with the population.35  Gentile witnessed the war as a combatant during 2006 as 
a tactical unit commander in the violent Baghdad neighborhood of Ameriya.36 
 Gentile took issue with the, “misleading current narrative [that] contends…the 
recent lowering of violence in Iraq is due to the American ‘surge’ and the application of 
so-called ‘new’ counterinsurgency methods.”37  He disputes the “surge mythology” that 
asserted: 1. that the U.S. fumbled around in Iraq for five years until it got its act together 
under General Petraeus and conducted counterinsurgency “right,” 2. that U.S. units were 
“hunkered down” on large bases far removed from the population, and 3. that small 
combat outposts established in population centers reduced violence.  Gentile argued that 
U.S. tactical units were primarily conducting population security missions as early as 
2004 and the real cause of the reduced violence in Iraq was the “buying off [of] 
America’s former Sunni insurgent enemies” in the Sons of Iraq program and Muqtada al-
Sadr’s ceasefire with the U.S. and the Government of Iraq.38  
 Rosen expanded on Gentile’s basic point about the inherently Iraqi causes of the 
reduction in violence.  He stated that the violence decreased because the ethno-sectarian 
civil war ended with the Shia proving victorious.  This condition enabled all of the 
success associated with the surge.  The Sunnis, as the war’s “losers,” were motivated to 
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seek the best alliance possible to ensure their continued survival by turning on Al Qaeda 
in Iraq and striking a short-term tactical bargain with the United States military.  Without 
a credible external communal threat, the Shia militias fell to in-fighting among 
themselves and preying on their own community through criminal activities.  This 
criminalization, fracturing, and loss of legitimacy led Muqtada al-Sadr to declare a 
ceasefire and eventually depart Iraq in an attempt to disavow the most extreme elements 
of the Jaysh al-Mahdi and recast himself as a social movement leader.  Echoing Metz, 
Rosen stated that, “Had the surge occurred a year earlier, it would have met far greater 
resistance.”   The success of the surge is mainly attributable to the following factors:  
  1. The civil war ended with Shias victorious and Baghdad largely   
   “cleansed” of mixed-sect neighborhoods.     
  2. Sunnis, as the weakest sect, were willing to cooperate with the U.S. 
  3. Shia militias began in-fighting and turned to organized crime.   
  4. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki attempted to make his government less  
   sectarian.                            
  5. The U.S. added 30,000 troops.                                                                                                                                    
  6. U.S. forces adopted effective counterinsurgency tactics. 39 
 Metz, Gentile, and Rosen all prioritized the timing of the surge as the most 
important factor in decreasing violence in Iraq.  While they did not dispute the presence 
of a confluence of factors, Iraqi conditions and trends enabled any success attributable to 
the surge.   Whether the surge was an appropriate strategy adopted for a changed security 
environment, as Metz contended, or a result of the end of the Sunni-Shia civil war, as 
Gentile and Rosen argued, “timing” remained the critical factor.                                                     
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C.  Specific Strands of Surge Arguments 
 The following paragraphs detail specific arguments that fall within the broad 
framework of the confluence versus timing debate, but represent areas of special 
emphasis within the literature.  These include three strands of thought that could be 
categorized under the confluence heading: 1. tactical innovation, 2. operational art, and 3. 
problem framing.  The sole timing argument, the surge as false victory, has the least in 
common with the dominant debate and will serve as our starting point. 
     False Victory 
 Benjamin Friedman, Harvey M. Sapolsky, and Christopher Preble’s “Learning the 
Right Lessons From Iraq” is an argument against the entire question of the Iraq War 
posed by anti-war activists, international relations “realist” scholars, and libertarians, 
among others.40  Friedman et al., argued against the conventional wisdom that the surge 
succeeded because of more troops, better U.S. interagency cooperation, and better 
counterinsurgency doctrine.  They regard the entire Iraq War as a catastrophic strategic 
failure for the United States which highlights the need for a new U.S. national security 
strategy, not a better tactical or technical approach.  Friedman and his co-authors reject 
what they saw as the root assumption of the entire surge debate - that Iraq was ever 
“ours” to transform - as inherently flawed; maintaining that democratization and nation 
building cannot be imposed by force of arms by outsiders.  Military power may allow a 
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state to conquer another, but it does not give it the power to effectively administer the 
conquered.41   
 The invasion of Iraq exposed deep ethnic and sectarian cleavages within Iraqi 
society that no amount of military firepower or organizational skill could remedy.  The 
real problem with U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine in general, and the surge debate in 
particular, is that it requires an outside military force to solve deep-seated political 
problems.  The counterinsurgent is required to master the nuances of the target culture, 
avoid counterproductive violence, integrate government civilians and reconstruction into 
the military plan, train local forces well, pick local allies wisely, and protect civilians 
where they live.  Failure in any one domain can mean failure for the entire venture; 
therefore, it is very hard for the counterinsurgent to win, and very hard for the insurgent 
to lose.   According to Friedman et al., the real lesson of Iraq is that there are inherent 
limits to American military power and that counterinsurgency tactics by foreign militaries 
are bound to fail because of their complexity and ambiguity.  The authors offered a core 
set of factors that cause the U.S. to consistently fail at counterinsurgency: 1. the U.S. is 
not an empire; the Department of State is not a colonial service and none of the organs of 
government are designed or intended to administer occupied, foreign territories, 2.  the 
U.S. military has an ingrained dislike of counterinsurgency; this type of fighting is too 
political, low-tech, manpower intensive, and ambiguous for the U.S., 3. U.S. 
parochialism; the U.S. government and society lack the deep reservoirs of foreign 
language and cultural competencies required, and 4.  small wars, like Iraq, are simply not 
in the vital national interests of the United States. 
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Tactical Innovation 
 James Russell did not offer an argument about the success of the surge in Iraq but 
provided a study of tactical level adaptation in combat.  He took issue with an element of 
the popular press assertions that General Petraeus imposed counterinsurgency tactics on 
U.S. combat units and that improved tactical performance resulted from the 2006 
publishing of the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps’ counterinsurgency manual.  His 
case studies of three U.S. Army brigades and three U.S.M.C. battalions operating in 
Anbar and Ninewa provinces between 2005 and 2007 painted a much more complicated 
picture in which battlefield adaptation actually led larger level organizational innovation.  
Russell contended that the tactical innovation and success of U.S. units in Anbar province 
had a strategic impact on the course of the war.  Tactical level momentum in Anbar was a 
result of small unit experimentation in a process of bottom-up innovation.42 
 Prior to the arrival of General Petraeus in 2007, no U.S. military or civilian leader 
had conducted a comprehensive examination of the U.S. approach to the war.  Despite 
this lack of understanding and the strategic confusion in Washington, D.C., army and 
marine brigade and battalion commanders were able to engage in “an iterative process of 
organically generated tactical adaptation and innovation.” Simply stated, a combination 
of desperation and a complete lack of higher headquarters restraints led to tactical 
innovation in combat.  By historical comparison the Iraq War did not resemble the U.S. 
experience in Vietnam: there was no higher headquarters preferred “solution” in Iraq.  
The army actually embraced counterinsurgency competencies as official doctrine in 2006 
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and its units “evolved” organically over time during multiple deployments.  Russell 
argued that tactical practice in the field “pulled” the institution along behind it in a 
process that was: 
 Dialectical in nature and drew upon a complex series of forces from both within 
 and outside the units that fused together in ways to produce organically generated 
 change-change that eventually ‘pulled’ tactical practice, institutional innovation, 
 and (finally) authoritative doctrinal pronouncements along behind it.43 
Conventional Operational Art 
 Kimberly Kagan’s work may be situated squarely in the conventional confluence 
camp of Iraq War surge explanations, but her book, The Surge: A Military History, took a 
unique look at the surge as a comprehensive, and surprisingly conventional, military 
campaign.  Her stated goal was to uncover an operational level of counterinsurgency in 
the Iraq War.  As Kagan observed, “there is no shortage of compelling individual stories, 
but the glut of such stories often obfuscates more than it clarifies.”  Kagan argued that 
General Casey’s attempts to secure Baghdad during 2006 actually served to intensify 
sectarian violence: 1. U.S. forces were pulled from other parts of Iraq to operate in 
Baghdad, leaving those locations “uncovered” to insurgents, 2. U.S. units focused mainly 
on Sunni districts, 3. too few U.S. forces were dedicated to holding neighborhoods once 
they were cleared, and 4. the Iraqi Security Forces were heavily infiltrated by Shia 
militias and sending Iraqi units into Sunni neighborhoods inserted Shia militias into those 
neighborhoods.  The net result of this effort was the further alienation of the Sunni 
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population from the U.S. military and Iraqi government and the spread sectarian violence 
into Sunni districts.44 
 According to Kagan, the real success of the surge was General Ray Odierno’s 
series of four military offensives in 2007 and 2008 to break the cycle of violence and 
defeat the insurgencies.   The “real” surge Kagan described, was the “first coordinated, 
offensive campaign against the insurgency in Iraq” which “took the initiative from the 
enemy at the operational, and strategic, level.”45 This campaign plan was based upon 
counterinsurgency principles, conventional campaign planning, and the first deep 
understanding of the strategies of Jaysh al-Mahdi and Al Qaeda in Iraq.46  With the 
enemy strategies in mind, General Odierno planned offensives to: 1. clear and hold 
Baghdad, 2. clear the belts around Baghdad to protect the capital, and 3. pursue 
dislocated insurgents throughout central Iraq. 
 Kagan credited the new strategies of Generals Petraeus and Odierno and their 
opportunistic use of combat and non-combat operations with decreasing the levels of 
violence in 2007.  In contrast to Rosen and Gentile, she saw the renewed offensives that 
attacked the insurgents' strategies as causing the spread of the Anbar Awakening 
throughout Iraq and the disintegration of Jaysh al-Mahdi.  The real success of the surge 
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was due to Petraeus and Odierno’s use of military power to serve clear political 
objectives in breaking the cycle of communal violence in Iraq.47 
Problem Framing 
 David Kilcullen characterized the surge as a tactical success within a strategic 
failure.   The U.S. saved itself from a disaster of its own making and a situation that it 
should never have gotten itself into in Iraq.  Kilcullen highlighted the U.S. military’s lack 
of deep understanding of Iraqi societal dynamics until late 2006. Understanding the 
nature of the problem on its own terms and in its own context, the most important 
principle of counterinsurgency, was the single most important factor in the success of the 
surge.  By 2006 General George Casey’s strategy of transitioning security responsibilities 
to the Iraqi Security Forces was feeding the cycle of violence in Iraq.  First, his strategy 
separated the U.S. troops from the population it was meant to secure and further alienated 
the Iraqi people from the American military. Second, by handing security for Sunni areas 
to the Iraqi Security Forces infiltrated by Shia militia, the U.S. perpetuated the cycle of 
sectarian violence.  The turning point in Iraq occurred when U.S. forces began to 
understand the true nature of the problem in Iraq.48 
 Conceptually, Kilcullen described Iraq as a failing state with three distinct, yet 
interrelated conflicts ongoing: a terror campaign, an insurgency, and a communal 
conflict.  U.S. action against the terror campaign - the most significant part of U.S. action 
until 2007 - had perverse and unintended consequences in the other domains.  For 
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example, killing a Sunni terrorist leader might be a prudent counterterrorism measure for 
U.S. forces, but the terror leader’s tribe would now be an implacable foe of the 
occupation and more likely to ally with foreign Al Qaeda elements to target Shia 
population centers for attack.  Understanding this dynamic and that Iraqi civil society was 
essentially tribal in nature, were the key factors in U.S. success in reducing the violence 
in Iraq.  Under General Petraeus, U.S. forces adopted population security tactics, co-
opted reconcilable insurgents, expanded Iraqi politics to include Sunnis, marginalized 
extremists, and eliminated irreconcilable terrorists and insurgents. Without this 
fundamental understanding of Iraqi society and the nature of the problem, the U.S. would 
never have been able to take advantage of the Sunni Tribal Awakening that fractured the 
Sunni insurgent alliance with Al Qaeda.  This fracture provided a tractable entry point for 
the U.S. to end the cycle of violence.49 
D. Gaps in the Surge Literature  
Dearth of Iraqi Sources 
 In the U.S. there is a distinct lack of mainstream Iraqi sources on the latter stages 
of the Iraq War.  Scholar, Saddam-era exile, and former Iraqi Minister of Defense (2004) 
and Minister of Finance (2005), Dr. Ali A. Allawi, wrote one of the most prominent Iraqi 
accounts of the war up to late 2006.50  However, there is not a comparable work by an 
Iraqi on the latter stages of the Iraq War.  There are also a considerable number of Iraqi 
voices in blogs on the internet: two of the most famous are Salam Pax and Riverbend, 
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with many more Iraqi and Western bloggers archived at Iraq Bloggers Central.51  This 
seems to be an untapped resource for western scholars without Arabic language ability or 
the wherewithal to travel to Iraq to conduct research.  It does however, have some serious 
limitations and drawbacks.  The BBC reported that as of 2007 only 7.4 percent of Iraqi 
households owned personal computers.52  Combine this statistic with the lack of reliable 
electricity and the limited number of fluent English-speaking Iraqis, and a picture begins 
to develop that Iraqi bloggers may be a highly educated, wealthy, and fairly secular group 
- perhaps also mainly Sunni - that does not necessarily represent mainstream Iraqi 
opinions or perspectives.  Furthermore, with the sectarian violence of 2006, many 
educated Iraqis and prominent bloggers fled the country. That being said, blogs still 
provide a unique, if limited, resource for balancing the U.S. military-centrism existing in 
the dominant literature on the surge. 
Classification 
 Since the Iraq War is an ongoing conflict, even with U.S. military withdrawal 
complete, there is a lack of archival data available for research.  Many government and 
military documents remain classified and inaccessible for study.  Due to the fact that U.S. 
military and government agencies in Iraq utilized a classified computer network for 
reports and day-to-day business, many mundane and non-sensitive documents remain 
classified merely because they were stored on classified computers or transmitted on a 
classified network.  Unfortunately for the researcher, WikiLeaks is not the Vietnam War-
era Pentagon Papers.  WikiLeaks is mainly composed of raw, unit level reports.  It lacks 
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the analysis and perspective provided by the Pentagon Papers, which were an internal 
Department of Defense review of the war, and not merely a collection of thousands of 
tactical “contact” reports.53   
 Finally, as alluded to by Bob Woodward and detailed by the BBC’s Mark Urban, 
there is an entire element of the Iraq War that is shrouded in secrecy: the role of special 
operations forces.54  Due to the highly secretive nature of U.S. and U.K. special missions 
in the Iraq War, the role of General Stanley McChrystal and the Joint Special Operations 
Command is poorly understood.  Urban painted a picture of this aspect of the war that 
may prove more critical to the full story than the dominant narrative has accounted for.  
The Joint Special Operations Command was responsible for the death of Al Qaeda in Iraq 
leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the disruption of Al Qaeda’s middle leadership, the 
disruption of Jaysh al-Mahdi “Special Groups,” the capture of Iranian agents in Iraq, and 
perhaps, as indicated by Urban, played a central role in the Anbar Awakening and 
reorienting the entire U.S. strategy of the surge. The prominence of General Graeme 
Lamb - as the commander of U.K. special operations forces and then as the deputy to 
Generals Casey and Petraeus - as the Coalition point-man on reconciliation with Sunni 
insurgents, indicates that the role of special mission units and their leadership is a ripe 
area for further study in the history of the Iraq War.55  
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Sequencing of Events 
 A major point of contention within the surge literature revolves around the causal 
relationship between trends in Iraq and the U.S. decision in late 2006 to shift strategy and 
deploy additional troops to Iraq.  Did the surge cause the Sunni revolt against Al Qaeda, 
the splintering of the Jaysh al-Mahdi, and the end of the ethno-sectarian civil war?  Or 
did it merely take advantage of, or coincide, with these trends that were already 
established?  Understanding this dynamic is complicated and a definitive explanation 
might be impossible to achieve, but a clearer understanding of the sequencing events in 
late 2006 and early 2007 is needed within the surge literature. 
 It is clear that the Sunni revolt against Al Qaeda preceded the surge by many 
months, but there had been earlier indications of possible splits between Al Qaeda and 
tribal elements in Anbar.  From 2004 until early 2006, there were multiple localized 
attempts by tribes and tribal confederations to seek alliances with U.S. forces and the 
Iraqi government against al Qaeda.  However, these nascent tribal realignments were all 
eventually fruitless because of a combination of Al Qaeda assassination campaigns 
against their leaders, U.S. reluctance to commit military force to help these groups, and 
Iraqi government paranoia about supporting Sunni tribal militias in Anbar.56  Multiple 
local security initiatives failed in Anbar because U.S. forces maintained the unreasonable 
standard, for Sunni Anbaris, that they must be posted away from their home villages to 
another area of Iraq if they were recruited into the ISF.  It is obvious why a Sunni from 
Anbar would not be interested in serving in a Shia-dominated army or police force that 
                                                 
56
 William Doyle, A Soldier's Dream: Captain Travis Patriquin and the Awakening of Iraq (New York: 
New American Library, 2011) 109, 111, 112, 114.; and Biddle, Friedman and Shapiro, 11-14. 
 30 
was infiltrated by Shia extremists.  Naturally, the Shia-dominated central government, 
with its paranoia of a neo-Saddam counterrevolution by Sunnis, actively undermined 
Sunni inclusion in local security services in their home districts.  
 While it is clear that the Anbar tribal awakening against Al Qaeda was largely a 
local affair precipitated more by internal Sunni developments than U.S. actions, this 
movement was sustained by close coordination with U.S. forces throughout the 
province.57  Furthermore, the Anbar Awakening and the Sons of Iraq program were 
related, but distinct, movements; the former was an indigenous political and military 
movement, assisted by the U.S. and isolated to Anbar province, while the latter was a 
U.S.-inspired and funded program that was instituted at the local level throughout Iraq 
and eventually included Shia groups.  It is unlikely that the Anbar Awakening could have 
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survived, much less spread beyond the specific ethnic, political, military context of Anbar 
province, without U.S. military assistance.  It is also clear that the Sons of Iraq movement 
would never have been established by the government of Nouri al-Maliki without the 
constant intercession of Generals Petraeus and Odierno and the efforts of U.S. tactical 
units to make the program a reality the government of Iraq had to grudgingly accept.  
What is unclear is the relative importance of the initial Sunni revolt in Ramadi in relation 
to the surge of U.S. forces and the Sons of Iraq program.58  Was there a sequential 
ordering required for these developments?  Did they merely coincide, or did one lead to 
another? 
 Nir Rosen asserted that Muqtada al-Sadr lost control of his militia, the Jaysh al-
Mahdi, because of the Shia victory in the 2006 ethno-sectarian civil war.  Without as 
many Sunnis to kill, the militia fragmented and turned to criminal activity and preyed 
upon the Shia community it had previously protected.  This loss of control led Muqtada 
to declare a ceasefire and eventually travel to Iran to conduct religious studies.59  
However, Patrick Cockburn argued that Muqtada feared the surge of U.S. forces and the 
targeting of Jaysh al-Mahdi extremists by special forces and conventional units.  al-Sadr 
believed that the U.S., Nouri al-Maliki’s government, Sunni extremists, and other 
factions within the Shia community were all out to get him and that these factors 
combined with increased fragmentation and criminality within his organization led al-
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Sadr to declare a ceasefire and eventually leave Iraq.60  This issue relates directly to the 
final question of sequencing detailed below: did the Jaysh al-Mahdi simply implode 
because it “won” the civil war, or did the surge disrupt Jaysh al-Mahdi organizational 
coherence by separating Sunni from Shia with checkpoints, barriers, combat outposts, 
and targeting of mid and senior-level leadership? 
 The final issue of sequencing encompasses both of the previous questions within 
the whole of the Iraq War problem.  Was the civil war simply over by late 2006 as Rosen, 
Gentile, and Friedman argue, or was the cycle of violence broken by the U.S. surge as 
Kilcullen, Kagan and others argue?  It is clear that Al Qaeda in Iraq was in trouble by late 
2006 in Anbar province because of the tribal alliance with U.S. Army and Marine forces, 
but, does this mean that it was on the defensive throughout Iraq as well?  Kagan 
convincingly argues that it was not; Al Qaeda had a strategic stranglehold on Baghdad 
from its ring of support zones that surrounded the capital in the Baghdad “belts.”61  Was 
the situation in Anbar sufficient to weaken Al Qaeda throughout Iraq or was it more of a 
severe tactical defeat rather than a strategic one?  The high tempo of sustained attacks 
that Al Qaeda was able to maintain in Baghdad after “losing” Anbar seems to indicate 
that the Anbar Awakening was a major, yet isolated, defeat that did not strategically 
cripple Al Qaeda’s operations throughout Iraq.  
 The case of Jaysh al-Mahdi also offers some interesting avenues of investigation.  
If the Shia had in fact won the civil war it seems curious that its charismatic leader, 
Muqtada al-Sadr, would declare a ceasefire at his moment of ascendant victory and 
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within months depart the country altogether.  Even if al-Sadr’s organization was 
fragmenting and criminalized, wouldn’t it have been preferable for Muqtada to remain 
and lead a powerful fraction of the organization in victory?  And if he had won the civil 
war, why leave the tottering government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki standing?  
 A brief examination of Baghdad sectarian demographics before and after the 
surge may provide a possible answer to these questions.  Graphical analysis from a BBC 
report of Baghdad’s sectarian demographics shows the divisions in Baghdad before and 
after 2006.62  It is apparent that the civil war achieved a distinct “hardening” of sectarian 
divisions within the capital, with many mixed neighborhoods becoming either majority 
Shia or majority Sunni. The Sunni still held significant neighborhoods on the east side of 
the Tigris River and the Shia made significant inroads in western Baghdad – the 
traditional stronghold of Sunni Baghdadis.   While it is clear that the Shia, with their 
numerical advantage and influence within the security forces, gained significantly in the 
sectarian conflict, but it was not a decisive victory.  Rosen characterized this as the 
“ethnic cleansing” of Baghdad, but this precarious distribution of sects within Baghdad 
hardly indicates a strategic victory or a total loss for either side.  Militias of both sects 
succeeded in clearing mixed-sect communities, but neither belligerent cleared the core of 
the other side’s traditional strongholds.63  Furthermore, Al Qaeda still maintained the 
ability to mount devastating car and suicide bomb attacks from the “belts” while Sunni 
militias still tenaciously held some eastern Baghdad neighborhoods.  It is arguable that 
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the civil war had simply reached a “tactical pause” in late 2006.  This lull was an 
opportunity for each sect to regroup and rearm for even more devastating violence in 
2007.  This question seems to be at the heart of the debate between the two sides within 
the dominant narrative and deserves additional study and analysis.  
Organizational Change in the U.S. Army 
 Beyond the question of the factors that caused the decrease in the levels of 
violence in 2007 Iraq, or the appropriateness of U.S. grand strategy, is the question often 
missed in the discussions of the surge.  Arguments about the surge seem to focus on 
broad macro-level factors or deeply contextualized micro- factors.  Missing from the 
surge literature is an analysis of the U.S. Army as a “whole” organization during the 
surge era of the Iraq War.  While many authors do an outstanding job of capturing the 
high politics of the war, such as Ricks, Cloud and Jaffe, and Metz, while others, like 
Rosen, West, and Doyle provide contextualized individual narratives of small units and 
individuals, there is little written about how the army as an organization dealt with and 
adapted to the changes in the Iraq War.   
 James Russell makes significant progress in addressing this gap in the literature.  
His excellent work, Innovation, Transformation, and War, focused deeply on the bottom-
up aspects of tactical unit innovation in combat.  While his work was comprehensive and 
persuasive, by leaving out a clear narrative of how organizational change from the top-
down and the bottom-up interacted, it provided an incomplete understanding of change in 
the army.  Russell’s case studies demonstrated that tactical units engaged in tremendous 
learning processes that resulted in innovation and experimentation that eventually 
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changed the army as an institution.64  However, this is a limited and perhaps misleading 
characterization of a virtuous cycle of innovation.  Perhaps the units that Russell studied 
all had particularly enlightened leadership, or perhaps they were so far from the higher 
headquarters in Baghdad that their units were free to experiment without interference; 
regardless, not all units in all parts of Iraq experienced this same virtuous cycle of 
innovation.  There are numerous examples of army units facing difficult combat 
situations and failing to adapt as demonstrated by unit implosion, retrenchment in 
conservative doctrines, or by exhibiting increasing levels of violence toward civilians and 
insurgents alike.65   
 To address this gap in the literature, a study of the interaction of factors from the 
top-down and the bottom-up within the U.S. Army is required.  The dominant narrative is 
not necessarily incorrect in its argument insofar as the surge, whatever its long term 
historical impact on U.S. grand strategy and the future of Iraq, was a major, traumatic 
event that required dramatic organizational change from the army as an institution.  This 
seems fertile ground for investigation as Russell and other observers have indicated with 
their descriptions of the unprecedented “connectivity” that U.S. Army soldiers and units 
had both formally and informally between deployed and garrison units.  These 
connections were forged through blog posts, private email correspondence, and use of 
private internet forums like the Small Wars Journal.66  This “horizontal integration” 
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among individuals seems particularly interesting when contrasted with nearly complete 
lack of “horizontal integration” between deployed and institutional army headquarters 
until 2007.  As described by Ricks and others, the U.S. command in Iraq often operated 
in a vacuum of guidance from Washington, D.C. as senior military and political leaders 
acted as if there was not a major war going on in Iraq.67   
 Connecting the small unit and individual experience of the U.S. Army in Iraq with 
the political, bureaucratic, and strategic struggles in Washington, D.C. and Baghdad 
seems critical to understanding how and why the U.S. military was able to achieve an 
unlikely tactical success in a situation that was widely believed to be hopeless.  The 
interaction of the tactical and the strategic, and the bottom-up and top-down, are all 
essential to understanding the organizational dynamics of the army in Iraq.  How did the 
experience of individuals drive major changes in the institution while still being 
constrained by older philosophies? How were organizational leaders able to mobilize and 
deploy new interpretations of old events to deal with the challenge of Iraq?  Were these 
changes in doctrine, structure, and practice merely instrumental or do they indicate long-
term change for the army as an institution?    
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CHAPTER III 
THE POST VIETNAM NARRATIVE 
 
“I’ll be damned if I permit the United States Army, its institutions, its doctrines,                                                  
and its traditions to be destroyed just to win this lousy war.”68 
 
 To appreciate the context of the internal army struggle over the conduct of the 
Iraq War, an understanding of the culture of the U.S. Army is required.  The conventional 
definition of culture as “norms, values, and traditions…” is valid, but quite limited, in 
understanding the wartime army in the era of Iraq, 2005 to 2007.  Borrowing a concept 
from sociology, it is useful to conceive of culture, not as a single variable or an 
unchanging, primordial phenomenon, but as an indivisible part of the organization.69  
Thus, organizations do not have a culture as much as they are a culture.  The “lessons of 
history,” or dominant narratives about past events, are powerful forces within an 
organizational culture, particularly the army’s.  The dominant interpretation of history 
informs the structure, doctrine, and operations of the service.   
 The immediate post Vietnam era was a very difficult time for the U.S. Army. It 
endured a bloody defeat in South Vietnam, it was buffeted by national strategic shifts 
under the Nixon Doctrine, and it found its very structure being dramatically altered with 
the end of the draft.  Military defeat in a war that the army as an institution never fully 
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embraced, weighed heavily on the officer corps.  In contrast to the experience of the 
Second World War, there was little post-war institutional evaluation of Vietnam.  The 
army did not convene a board of high profile commanders to compile a set of 
authoritative lessons learned as it had after World War II.  In fact, a comprehensive study 
wasn’t undertaken until 1979 and then only by an external consulting agency.70 Needless 
to say, the study was not influential when finally published.  Of the major studies 
conducted by the army during and in the immediate aftermath of the war, only General 
Donn A. Starry’s Armored Combat in Vietnam enjoyed any longevity or popularity. 71  
This is due to the fact that the “lessons” of this work had less to do with Vietnam and 
more to do with the perceived efficacy of armored and mechanized combined arms 
tactics for the European battlefield.  This is indicative of the narrative that developed in 
the post Vietnam army:  the main lesson of the Vietnam War was that the army shouldn’t 
fight wars like Vietnam.   
 This lesson was institutionalized in a variety of doctrinal and structural ways.  In 
the mid 1970s the powerful commanding general of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine 
Command (TRADOC), General William DePuy, developed a new formal doctrine to 
shape force structure and combat capabilities with a singular focus on conventional 
warfare.  In the late 1970s, Army War College instructor, Colonel Harry Summers, 
captured the post Vietnam zeitgeist with his influential study of the Vietnam War using 
“Clausewitzian” principles as his frame of analysis.  Beyond influencing an entire 
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generation of officers with his argument that the U.S. lost in Vietnam because it had 
ignored the conventional nature of the war, he inspired the formulation of the Weinberger 
Doctrine.  Where DePuy used formal tactical and operational doctrine to constrain what 
the army thought of as legitimate war, the Weinberger/Powell Doctrine72 served as an 
informal strategic vision that hardened the post Vietnam narrative into a rigid orthodoxy.  
At the end of the Cold War, when the assumptions of this dominant narrative might have 
come into question, the First Gulf War - Operation Desert Storm - seemed to “prove” the 
validity of both the army’s focus on high-intensity mechanized war and its narrow 
concept of the nature of war as defined by the Powell Doctrine.  Both the restrictions of 
the Powell Doctrine on policy makers and the reluctance of senior military leaders to 
embrace “Operations Other Than War”73 contributed to an intellectual drift over the 
purpose of the U.S. Army throughout the 1990’s.  The army leadership focused on force-
restructuring and digitalization while still maintaining the assumptions of the post 
Vietnam narrative and its narrow focus on conventional war.  This rigid orthodoxy made 
it almost impossible for the army leadership to effectively resist the powerful Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who had an even greater faith in technology, firepower, and 
precision weapons than did the generals, but shared none of their reservations about using 
that force.74    
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 The post Vietnam narrative was established and maintained by a new conception 
of doctrine as a central organizational statement of philosophy, structure, and mission.  It 
served as a rigid concept of what constituted legitimate missions for the military.  
Increasingly since the end of the First World War, but particularly in the post Vietnam 
era, formal doctrine75 had risen to a position of unrivalled power within the organization 
and had largely determined procurement priorities, training standards, methods of 
operation, and created a specific vision of war for many members of the service. After 
Vietnam, army doctrine evolved into a concept that operated on three levels: 1. as a 
written, formal, and authoritative institutional guidebook for “war or non-war activities”76  
2. as the common operational practice of the army or its “fighting doctrine”,77 and 3. as 
an informal or “assumed” doctrine which was composed of widely held organizational 
beliefs about the “essence” or purpose of the army.78  As an organizational concept, 
doctrine became the clearest statement of the philosophy of the army.     
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A.  Formal Doctrine: Field Manual 100-5 Operations, 1976   
 Using the 1973 October War79 as an inspiration and justification, General DePuy, 
the commanding general of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) elevated 
written formal doctrine to the dominant position within the army regarding training, force 
structure, officer education, and more subtly, with regard to the institutional philosophy 
of war.80  DePuy believed in the overriding importance of training in his reform plan for 
the post Vietnam fighting army81 and he initially concluded that the U.S. Army needed 
better training methods and standards, but not necessarily better doctrine.82  The 1973 
October War provided DePuy an unexpected opportunity to revolutionize the way in 
which the army trained, organized, and thought about war by inspiring the formulation of 
“Active Defense” doctrine in FM 100-5, Operations. 
 Using battlefield tours and after action reviews of Israeli commanders, DePuy 
ordered TRADOC to update army tactical doctrine in light of this new reality of modern 
                                                 
79
 The Yom Kippur War to Israelis and the Ramadan War to Arabs. 
 
80
  In previous generations, doctrine had served as a secondary and often ignored element of the U.S. Army.  
Common practice of the field forces had generally dominated the army’s inspiration for training and 
thinking about war.80  In the post World War II era, with perhaps the seven years of Vietnam as an 
exception, the needs and practices of the U.S. Army field forces in Europe dominated training methods and 
evaluation standards throughout the army.  The needs and practice of the U.S. Army in Europe were 
understandably narrow as they faced an overwhelming armored conventional threat across the European 
plain in the army of the Soviet Union. Kretchik, 6.; and Spiller, 41, 43. 
 
81
 DePuy based this opinion on his World War II service as a battalion commander in the U.S. 90th Infantry 
Division.  Over a period of six weeks during the Battle of Normandy, DePuy’s division lost 100% of its 
soldiers and 150% of its officers as casualties.  He witnessed the relief for incompetence, cowardice, and 
bad luck of two division commanders, multiple regimental commanders, and various other staff officers 
and commanders. Spiller, 44.  
 
82
 DePuy’s experience in Vietnam, in which he pioneered “search and destroy” tactics as the commanding 
general of the 1st Infantry Division, did not move him from his conclusions on training’s ultimate 
importance. Lock-Pullan, 497.   
 42 
war.83  Just as the Russo-Japanese War provided a preview of the static trench warfare of 
World War I, DePuy believed that the October War provided a model of conventional 
conflict between NATO and the Soviet Union.84  DePuy drew several conclusions from 
this war, based partly on analysis of the actual combat, but mostly on themes he had 
already been stressing about modern war.  These conclusions informed his vision of war 
that, 1. combat would be short, violent, and destructive,  2. war would be “come-as-you-
are,” there would be no time for a mobilization phase, 3. war would be fought by 
relatively small, outnumbered U.S. forces, and 4. combat would be defensive, firepower-
centric, and technology-intensive.   This type of combat adhered to DePuy’s own 
personal vision of war, and perhaps most importantly, it was untainted with any 
association with the war in Vietnam.  The October War was a return to the type of 
conflict that DePuy and other conventional generals knew and understood well: total war 
in the model of the Second World War. 85   
 DePuy’s reorientation of the army back to conventional war was reactionary, but 
his method of achieving that shift was revolutionary.  Doctrine in the history of the U.S. 
Army played a secondary or even tertiary role, in the life of the service. Doctrine was 
generally the codification of common practice.  DePuy’s revolution was achieved by 
creating a single manual that captured a very specific philosophy of war that drove the 
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development of all subordinate doctrinal publications, tactical training standards, force 
structure, and officer education. 86 
 DePuy also established detailed and prescriptive training standards that reinforced 
the tenets of his Active Defense doctrine from the division to the squad level.  TRADOC 
authors developed the Army Training Evaluation Program that provided a literal checklist 
for the evaluation of tactical units in accordance with FM 100-5.  The ARTEP included 
every collective task that both combat and support units needed to accomplish in 
“modern war.”  The ARTEP system was augmented and reinforced by the Skill 
Qualification Test (SQT) which was an exhaustive list of individual tasks, organized by 
military occupational specialty, which every soldier had to accomplish to support the 
collective unit tasks of the ARTEP.  These standards were then used by TRADOC’s 
newly created Combat Training Centers (CTCs)87 to evaluate tactical unit performance in 
large-scale maneuver training.  The ARTEP and SQT system reinforced from the bottom-
up in small unit training what DePuy’s FM 100-5 manual enforced from the top-down 
through “capstone” doctrine.88 
 Doctrine also became far more influential in officer education and career 
advancement.  Literal indoctrination became an overriding focus of army service schools 
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like the Command and General Staff School and the War College.  Additionally, training 
rotations at the training centers began to take on significant importance for officer career 
progression.  The evaluations of officers in career-making command and staff positions 
were increasingly based on performance during large unit maneuvers at the National 
Training Center.  Successful performance at these maneuvers was based on adherence to 
doctrinal tasks and missions as described in minute detail in ARTEPs and in more general 
terms in FM 100-5.  Thus, for promotion and demonstration of professional skill, officers 
were incentivized to study and internalize the assumptions of army doctrine; success in 
service schools was determined by studying doctrine and success in the field was 
determined by the application of that doctrine.  DePuy’s formal doctrine was able to 
shape common practice in field or the army’s “fighting doctrine” through training 
maneuvers at the National Training Center and other CTCs.89 
 Finally, DePuy’s formal doctrine broke new institutional ground by driving the 
procurement of specific weapon systems and methods of tactical organization.  Again 
using the October War as a model, DePuy’s Active Defense doctrine required certain 
weapon capabilities that didn’t exist in the army in 1976.90  Furthermore, tactical 
formations were also greatly impacted by FM 100-5.  Armor and mechanized infantry 
organizations became much more powerful communities within the army after Vietnam 
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because DePuy and his doctrine favored heavy mechanized forces over lighter forces, 
conventional over Special Forces,91 and narrowly-focused specialists over general 
purpose troops.92   
 Active Defense was not universally accepted within the army upon its release in 
1976 because it clashed with traditional elements of army culture.  General Donn Starry 
made significant changes to the next version of FM 100-5 as the next commander of 
TRADOC.  General Starry’s new FM 100-5 became even more famous than DePuy’s 
Active Defense doctrine under the name of “AirLand Battle.”  AirLand Battle rejected 
the most controversial aspects of Active Defense such as the focus on machines over 
individuals, defense over offense, and statistics over history.  However, all of the critical 
assumptions of Active Defense remained in defining what was considered “real” war.  
While AirLand Battle might have focused more attention on leadership, morale, and 
offensive action than Active Defense did, DePuy’s intellectual framework and  narrow 
focus on European land war survived intact.93 
 General DePuy used FM 100-5 as capstone doctrine combined with other 
elements of TRADOC’s structural power to institutionalize a rigid, tactically-focused 
vision of modern war that ingrained powerful assumptions within army culture.  Active 
Defense was essentially a rejection of the ambiguous, limited wars of not just Vietnam, 
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but of the entire post World War II era. DePuy’s real revolution, not a specific tactical 
formulation but the elevation of doctrine to a central position within the organization, was 
never circumscribed, in fact it was enhanced with subsequent capstone manuals. By 
narrowly defining legitimate or “real” war as high-intensity, state-on-state war, and 
training and equipping solely for that definition of war, the army was setting itself up to 
be ill-prepared, both intellectually and materially, for conflicts that fell outside the range 
of that limited definition.  The army became in effect, educated, organized, armed, and 
trained to operate in one small domain of war.  Anything falling outside of that domain 
was considered to be illegitimate, a distraction from the organizational purpose, or simply 
wrong.  
B.   Informal Doctrine: The Powell Doctrine 
 In 1981 Colonel Harry Summers, a veteran of Korea and Vietnam and an 
instructor at the U.S. Army War College, captured and catalyzed the post Vietnam War 
intellectual zeitgeist of the officer corps in his book, On Strategy: The Vietnam War in 
Context.  Colonel Summers used Clausewitzian principles of war to examine the U.S. 
defeat in Southeast Asia.  Summers argued that the conventional wisdom regarding the 
Vietnam War was wrong: the U.S. did not in fact lose an irregular counterinsurgency war 
in South Vietnam over the hearts and minds of the people, it lost a conventional war 
against the main force army of North Vietnam.  The U.S. defeat was attributed to failure 
to identify the true center of gravity of the Vietnam War as not in the south, but residing 
within the North Vietnamese state.  The U.S. lost in Vietnam because it was not 
conventional enough in prosecuting the war against the true enemy: North Vietnam. 
While many have subsequently questioned Summers’ analysis, in particular his 
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assumptions regarding likely North Vietnamese responses to the strategic approach 
outlined in his book, this work was widely heralded by senior army leaders, and adopted 
as the service’s authoritative account for the U.S. defeat in Vietnam.94 
 Summers’ conclusions were very appealing to many military officers; they 
supported the emerging army consensus on the lessons of the war.  In his 1987 PhD 
dissertation, The American Military and the Lessons of Vietnam, then Major David 
Petraeus outlined the institutional lessons learned in Vietnam as: 1. public support for 
protracted war is very short-lived and unstable, 2. military force lacks utility in non-
military - as in political - matters, 3. civilian political leaders are unreliable in time of 
war, and, 4.that an “all-or-nothing” approach to war is preferred.  Petraeus characterized 
Summers’ argument as a conservative reaction to the trauma of Vietnam that sought to 
shift blame for defeat from the military to, “timid politicians, civilian counterinsurgency 
experts, [and] the public.”95  
 General Colin Powell’s personal lessons drawn from Vietnam, also framed in the 
language of Clausewitz, corresponded closely with Summers’ narrative.96  The Powell 
Doctrine began its existence as the Weinberger Doctrine in 1984 while Powell served as 
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Secretary of Defense Weinberger’s military assistant.  The Weinberger Doctrine was 
initially devised as a statement of the post Vietnam consensus within the Department of 
Defense and as a reaction against ambiguous “presence” missions and other military 
interventions favored by Secretary of State George Schultz and others within the Reagan 
Administration.97  In his autobiography, Powell heartily approved of this doctrine by 
stating, “Clausewitz would have applauded.”  He stated that he used this as a “practical 
guide” in advising presidents and his only concern was that the list was stated too 
explicitly in public and that enemies might attempt to find “loopholes.”98  
 The Powell Doctrine neatly captured the post Vietnam narrative and reinforced 
the narrow definition of legitimate war as established by the formal doctrine of General 
DePuy’s FM 100-5, Operations.  If all seven tests of the Powell Doctrine were applied, 
the use of military force would be all but precluded except in the case of a conventional, 
high-intensity war against another state.  This was  precisely the type of war that the U.S. 
Army wanted to fight in the aftermath of the defeat in Vietnam.  With the combination of 
DePuy’s new conception of formal doctrine and the informal doctrine of Colin Powell, 
the post Vietnam narrative within the U.S. Army hardened into a rigid institutional 
orthodoxy with long term consequences for how the army perceived its security 
environment and prepared for war.  The Powell Doctrine also implanted the army’s post 
Vietnam narrative assumptions firmly within the national strategic consciousness, 
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establishing a permissive political environment for the army’s vision of itself and its 
conception of “modern” war. 
C.   Common Practice: Operation Desert Storm and the Post Cold War Era  
 Despite the monumental changes in the international system during the early 
1990s, the lopsided U.S.-led victory over Saddam Hussein in the 1991 Gulf War 
introduced a condition of doctrinal stasis in the U.S. Army.  Without Operation Desert 
Storm and its conventionally understood lessons, the U.S. Army might have been forced 
to reexamine the core assumptions of the post Vietnam narrative.  However, the Gulf War 
provided a useful, and apparently conclusive, argument about the future of modern war.  
Rather than relying on the proxy experience of the October War, the army now had its 
own short, violent, firepower-intensive, high-technology, and politically unambiguous 
“big” war.  For the leadership of the U.S. Army, particularly Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff General Colin Powell, the Gulf War validated the narrow prescriptions for the 
use of force prescribed by the Powell Doctrine.   Challenging the received institutional 
wisdom of the Gulf War was viewed as tantamount to disloyalty within the officer corps 
as this conflict was seen as redeeming the army from its defeat in Vietnam.99 
 After the Gulf War, Colin Powell added a seventh test, the use of overwhelming 
force, to the doctrine that bore his name.  In a 1992 article in Foreign Affairs Colin 
Powell outlined his vision for future U.S. military strategy.  He summarized a position in 
which most of the core assumptions of the post Vietnam era were confirmed.  He shifted 
focus from global war to regional war, but the examples used were conventional, high-
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intensity conflicts such as Operation Desert Storm and a potential conflict with North 
Korea.  New missions like peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance were mentioned, 
but the main focus was still on major war.  Powell’s argument in Foreign Affairs 
summarized the institutional army’s reaction to the end of the Cold War.100  Despite the 
dissolution of the Soviet threat, force reductions, and the expansion of “Operations Other 
Than War” the army made only minor adjustments from the 1980s. Strategic reality 
forced the army to at least acknowledge the end of the Cold War, but it is clear that the 
interventions of the 1990s were viewed as a distraction from the army’s primary mission 
of preparing for major, conventional war against another state.101 
 The Powell Doctrine animated the entire conduct of the Gulf War and all of its 
tests were satisfied in one way or another: overwhelming force was used and the war was 
terminated at the point where its most basic objectives had been met.  There was no real 
modification of the war aims during the campaign and significant levels of public support 
for the war were maintained throughout.  It is ironic that the overwhelming military 
victory that Powell had helped to engineer began a steady unraveling of his doctrine, 
particularly during the Clinton administration.  The now famous exchange between 
Powell and Madeline Albright clearly illustrates this process:   
 My constant, unwelcome message [to the Clinton administration] at all of the 
 meetings on Bosnia was simply that we should not commit military forces until 
 we had a clear political objective…Madeline Albright…asked me in frustration, 
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 “What’s the point of having this superb military that you’re always talking about 
 if we can’t use it?”  I thought I would have an aneurysm.102  
 
The restrictive nature of the Powell Doctrine did not long survive General Powell’s 
retirement in 1995 as it was almost immediately followed by the deployment of U.S. 
forces to long-term peacekeeping duties in the Balkans.103 
 Despite civilian leaders rejecting the Powell Doctrine in practice, if not in public 
statements, the senior leadership of the army still hewed closely to its vision of “real” 
war.  Army leaders focused on relatively minor organizational changes during this period 
such as Force XXI, the Army after Next, transformation, and the Revolution in Military 
Affairs.104  These initiatives only dealt tangentially with the requirements of the missions 
of the post Cold War world and were focused primarily on high-intensity war105    In an 
effort to bring the military’s overwhelming conventional advantage to bear on every type 
of operation, the army treated the operations in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo and Iraq, 
as conventional battles regardless of the specific mission or circumstances.  As General 
John Galvin commented in 1986, there is a, “propensity for the U.S. military to ‘invent’ a 
‘comfortable’ vision of war.” The post Vietnam narrative was only slightly modified in 
the 1990s, with all of its critical assumptions intact, and a vision of war developed for a 
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very specific time and place –the post Vietnam Cold War- became “the only way” of 
war.106 
 The result of the continued adherence to the post Vietnam narrative during the 
frequent use of U.S. military power abroad in the 1990s, was the development of a “Force 
protection” mindset107 among army officers.  Force protection was a natural progression 
from the logic of overwhelming force and the concern for support from the casualty-
sensitive public in the Powell Doctrine.  The Powell Doctrine recommended force 
protection as an organizational defense mechanism against ambiguous political wars that 
detracted from the army’s ability to prepare for major war.  The force protection 
obsession of the 1990s and beyond was a result of the intellectual rigidity imposed on 
army thinking about legitimate war and organizational purpose by the received wisdom 
of the post Vietnam narrative.108 
 Entering the 21st century the post Vietnam narrative provided the army with three 
ambiguous results: 1. it provided a much-needed renewal of professional identity for the 
officer corps, 2. it unraveled the civil-military consensus of the 1980s, and 3. it 
emphasized a general trend of risk aversion in the operational army.  Through the 
institutionalization of the DePuyian doctrine system, formal army doctrine grew to 
paramount importance within the service.  Rather than, as was historically the case, 
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reflecting conventional practice on warfighting, doctrine was now expected to predict 
future practice in war and prescribe in detail how wars were to be conducted.  This was 
perhaps achievable under DePuy’s rigid and narrow definition of war which was 
characterized as a short, violent, conventional ground war against the Soviet Union in 
Europe.109 However, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War 
removed the specificity that allowed this doctrinal system to function.  Historian Brian 
McAllister Linn defined this dynamic in the 1990s as the, “decade of doctrinal 
floundering.”110  This conservative definition of war that hearkened back to the army’s 
victory in Europe in 1945, narrowed the army’s vision and perhaps more importantly, 
limited  what missions were considered legitimate.  Thus, doctrine became a key 
component of officer education, individual soldier identity, unit and soldier success, force 
structure, and weapons procurement.  When combined with the strategic framework of 
the Powell Doctrine, orthodoxy was introduced into army thought that limited intellectual 
flexibility.  The explicit rejection of the experience of small wars, in the model of 
Vietnam, and the celebration of high intensity wars like World War II and Desert Storm, 
formed a dualistic conception of “good” and “bad” wars within the army’s philosophy of 
war.111  
 The unraveling of the power of the Powell Doctrine culminated in the tenure of 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Andrew Bacevich observed that Secretary 
Rumsfeld and his senior officials were, “Determined to have a decisive voice in deciding 
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when and where U.S. forces would go into battle, they also wanted to dictate how those 
forces would fight.112  The military gained unprecedented influence in foreign policy in 
the post Vietnam era, partially as a result of the 1987 Goldwater-Nichols defense 
reorganization act which created independent regional military combatant and functional 
commands. During the 1990s these commands played a powerful semi-independent role 
in regional diplomacy and military policy.113  The power of combatant commanders 
combined with Colin Powell’s significant personal influence over policy, convinced 
Rumsfeld that the power of the uniformed military needed to be reined in.114   
 In many respects Secretary Rumsfeld simply overmatched the senior leadership of 
the army, both intellectually and in ambition.  The intellectual drift of the army in the 
1990s led them to cling to a philosophy that was increasingly outmoded.  While 
Rumsfeld pursued a “Transformation” agenda115 that rejected most of the elements of the 
post Vietnam narrative, the army was consumed with the “color of berets” and the 
appropriate number of companies for a battalion.116  Rumsfeld shared the army 
leadership’s faith in the Revolution in Military Affairs and firepower, but shared none of 
their reticence to use that force for political objectives.  Rumsfeld’s vision of war as 
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short, lethal, and relatively easy -as demonstrated by the 2001 war in Afghanistan- totally 
undermined the U.S. Army’s seemingly ponderous adherence to a Cold War mindset.117 
 The orthodoxy of the DePuy and  Powell Doctrine system, as validated by 
Operation Desert Storm, cost the army an opportunity to reexamine some of the core 
assumptions of its philosophy of war in the dramatically changed circumstances of the 
post Cold War era.  Ideological retrenchment, doctrinal stasis, and conservatism 
characterized the intellectual drift of the army in the post Cold War era.  The assumptions 
of DePuy’s narrow vision of war had been rendered obsolete by the demise of the Soviet 
Union and the restrictive power of the Powell Doctrine was unraveled by the success of 
the Gulf War and changing civilian views on the utility of force.  Rather than address any 
of these contradictions within its philosophy, the army chose to tinker on the margins 
with new technology and organizational structures while clinging to the vision of future 
war that had served it so well in the aftermath of Vietnam.    
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CHAPTER IV 
DISSONANCE AND CHANGE IN THE IRAQ WAR 
A.  Why Did the U.S. Army Change in 2007?  
 Why did a critical mass of the army’s rank-and-file officers118 accept the shift in 
tactics and strategy recommended by Generals Petraeus, Keane and Odierno over the 
established strategy of Generals Casey and Abizaid in 2006 and 2007?  From an 
organizational culture perspective,119 it would have been easy for the army to simply have 
accepted the well established assumptions of the Casey strategy: that the army was 
incapable of nation building and that the situation in Iraq was essentially beyond repair 
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and accept the inevitable failure of the Iraq mission.  While difficult to accept, this failure 
could have been easily rationalized in the manner of the Vietnam War by blaming senior 
Bush Administration officials and the much-maligned Coalition Provisional Authority for 
“losing” the war through poor planning and disastrous decision making.  This narrative 
would have found favor with the broader conventional wisdom of the time by virtue of 
the many failures and questionable justifications for the initial invasion. This variation of 
the “stab-in-the-back” myth120 could have absolved the army of responsibility for losing 
the war and enabled the army to make a strong argument against engaging in 1990s-style 
nation building and irregular warfare ever again.    
 Thus, organizational theory would predict that the army would have resisted any 
significant change in 2007, blamed civilian political leaders for failure, and retrenched 
into the post Vietnam narrative with a reinforcement of existing beliefs and values about 
legitimate war.121  Despite the cultural logic of this predicted outcome, the army changed 
in significant and fundamental ways in the Iraq War.    The Casey and Abizaid strategy 
was clearly in line with powerful cultural values established by DePuy and Powell after 
Vietnam: the preference for unambiguous, high intensity war and the discomfort with 
limited, political contingency operations.  However, the Casey strategy resulted in 
irreconcilable contradictions at the tactical level, creating dissonance between what the 
strategy demanded and what tactical level commanders were compelled to do to succeed.   
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 At the tactical level the Casey strategy seemed designed not to achieve decisive 
success and Petraeus, Keane, and Odierno systematically addressed this by creating an 
intellectual framework for dealing with the complexities of Iraq through 
counterinsurgency doctrine, by achieving unity and commitment from the senior levels of 
government, and by finally creating a coherent and offensive campaign plan designed to 
achieve success.  Essentially, Generals Petraeus, Keane and Odierno made a better 
argument for their strategic vision than did Casey and Abizaid.  The Petraeus coalition 
recast the doctrinal and strategic conception of the war as based on achieving victory 
rather than on Casey’s more abstract institutional conception of avoiding another 
Vietnam War-style defeat.     
B.  The Casey/Abizaid Strategy                                                                            
                                        “Boring is good, General Casey, and I applaud you on that…                                                                   
  Clearly you are a master at it and it goes to the heart of your success.”122 
 General George Casey was an uncontroversial and “safe” choice to follow the 
bombastic and prickly Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez as the senior U.S. 
commander in Iraq.123  Casey was the son of Major General George Casey, Sr., the 
highest ranking officer killed in the Vietnam War.  The aftermath of the Vietnam left a 
powerful imprint on Casey and many other officers of his generation; as a young officer 
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he had to deal with the post Vietnam morass of poor discipline, rampant drug use, and 
racial tension within the ranks.  During his career he was promoted rapidly and 
experienced the difficulty of nation building first-hand in the 1996 U.S. mission in 
Bosnia.  Journalists David Cloud and Greg Jaffe characterized Casey as a diligent and 
intelligent officer, “the model Pentagon general: steady, apolitical, and hardworking.”124  
 Upon assumption of command, Casey initially maintained General Sanchez’s 
enemy-centric, capture/kill campaign against “Anti-Iraqi Forces,”125 but by the spring of 
2004 Casey formulated his own approach, which had, “two priority efforts – training 
Iraqi Security Forces and elections.” 126  It was assumed that a legitimate elected Iraqi 
government untainted by close association with U.S. forces would remove much of the 
fire from the insurgent cause.  Casey recalled later that while he was aware that the 
support of the people was required in counterinsurgency war, “I came at it little 
differently, I said, Yeah it’s the people, but the way we’re going to get to the people is 
through a legitimate government.”127  Casey’s emphasis on elections was a result of his 
experience in the Balkans in the 1990s, where elections were seen as essential to the U.S. 
exit strategy.  Casey’s strategy, based upon shifting security responsibility from U.S. 
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forces to Iraqi government forces came to be known as the “Transition” strategy and 
would define U.S. operations in Iraq from 2004 until early 2007. 
 In 2004 Casey planned for immediate troop reductions after the first national 
elections in early 2005.128 After national elections failed to quell the insurgency in March 
of 2005, Casey, with Abizaid’s consent, defined his Transition strategy as focusing 
primarily on the rapid transfer of security responsibility to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) 
with a corresponding U.S. withdrawal from Iraq.  Casey accelerated the training of Iraqi 
security units and shifted much of the burden on supplying trainers from the chronically 
understaffed Multinational Security Transition Command (MNSTC-I) to the “land-
owning” brigade combat teams responsible for area security.   
 In June 2006, despite the rising tide of sectarian violence in the wake of the 
February bombing of the Al Askari Mosque in Samarra, General Casey briefed the 
President and Secretary of Defense his “Securing Strategic Victory” plan that claimed 
Multinational Forces- Iraq (MNF-I) was on track to reduce troop strength from 134,000 
to 110,000 in the fall.  Despite concern from the White House that Casey “wasn’t going 
for the win,” Casey’s plan was approved.129  To counter growing calls for an escalation in 
Iraq from certain quarters in Washington after the failure of his attempts to secure 
Baghdad in 2006,130 Casey developed a “Transition Bridging Strategy” to use a limited 
increase in troop strength to man joint outposts in Baghdad with Iraqi Security Forces, 
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while the majority of U.S. forces would leave population centers altogether.  This plan 
envisioned U.S. forces sealing the borders and controlling supply routes to Kuwait while 
the Iraqi Security Forces fought the insurgency in the cities with embedded U.S. advisors.  
In a December 2006 briefing to an increasingly skeptical President Bush, Casey 
maintained that the Iraqi Security Forces could take over security by the summer of 2007 
and that no additional U.S. troops were needed.131  While also recommend by General 
Abizaid and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Peter Pace, this plan was not chosen 
for implementation by President Bush who favored the larger, more concentrated surge 
effort.132     
Logic of the Transition Strategy 
 The strategic thinking behind Casey’s strategy was based upon two explicit 
logical claims and two equally powerful implicit claims.  The first claim was based on the 
idea that U.S. forces attracted violence and fomented insurgent attacks by virtue of the 
Iraqi perceptions of the U.S. as an occupier.  This idea was based on a narrative 
championed by Central Command (CENTCOM) commander, General John Abizaid.133  
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Abizaid used the biology metaphor of an “antibody”134 to illustrate the position of U.S. 
forces in Iraqi society.  Because of unbridgeable cultural differences and the deep 
dysfunction of Iraqi society, U.S. forces would always be greeted with a violent reaction 
as an antibody in the “system” of Iraqi society.  Since Iraqis were humiliated by their 
defeat at the hands of the U.S. and they perceived the U.S. as an illegitimate and alien 
foreign occupier, Abizaid believed that any U.S. effort in Iraq was bound to fail and he 
supported the search for “quick fixes” to the war in 2003 and 2004 to speed U.S. exit.  
Abizaid’s antibody narrative and his significant moral authority formed a critical 
justification for Casey’s Transition strategy.135  Casey’s acceptance of the antibody 
narrative was also in accord with his own experience as a young officer in the aftermath 
of Vietnam, during ambiguous peacekeeping missions in the 1990s, and in line with 
Secretary Rumsfeld’s admonishment to “resist the temptation to do too much” in Iraq.136       
 The second explicit logic of the Transition strategy was that the average 
counterinsurgency war lasted 9 to 13 years, which, in light of the lessons of Vietnam, 
Casey viewed as too long for U.S. public support to last.  The way to bridge this gap was 
to train more Iraqi forces to take over fighting the insurgency as U.S. forces withdrew.137  
This reasoning was drawn directly from the conventional lessons drawn from the 
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Vietnam War and one of the critical points of the Powell Doctrine.  Counterinsurgency 
war simply took too long and exacted too high a price in casualties from the 
counterinsurgent force, sapping public support for the effort.  In order to maintain public 
support, both for the war and the army, Casey felt compelled to keep U.S. casualties low 
and keep the duration of the war short. 
 While not stated explicitly, Casey clearly believed that the political aspects of 
counterinsurgency war were inappropriate, and perhaps even impossible, tasks for the 
military to undertake.  In response to a fruitless effort to address early evidence of 
sectarianism in the ISF138 Casey recalled that, “As a military guy, I didn’t feel like I 
ought to dictate to the prime minister.” Casey interpreted his purview as senior U.S. 
commander in Iraq in a narrowly military way.   He didn’t believe that political or 
economic issues were his concern in a “sovereign” country with a full U.S. ambassador in 
residence.  Casey preferred strictly militarily achievable tasks; a mindset Casey 
developed in the aftermath of the Vietnam War and from his experience with 
peacekeeping missions in the 1990s.  He assumed that military power could establish 
security, but that it couldn’t force political compromise or moderate sectarian 
divisions.139  
 The final implicit claim of the of the Transition strategy was that the Iraq War, 
much as the Vietnam War had over twenty years earlier, had the potential to “break” the 
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army as an institution.  A long and ambiguous war in Iraq would endanger public support 
for the institution and blunt its capabilities in conventional war.  This logic was also 
informed by the post Vietnam understanding that tactical military success could be easily 
voided by short-sighted political leaders at home.  Therefore, in the best interests of the 
health of the army, a repetition of the trauma of the Vietnam War should be avoided at all 
costs. Subsequently, the commitment to the Iraq War needed to be limited in both time 
and scope with a rapid exit strategy.140    
Strategic Failure of Transition, 2004-2007 
 Among Casey’s first major decisions in 2004 was to order the closing of nearly all 
U.S. outposts in population centers and to consolidate U.S. forces on larger and more 
remote Forward Operating Bases (FOBs).  The FOB consolidation plan was designed to 
remove the “irritant” of U.S. soldiers from neighborhoods and to reduce U.S. casualties.  
The immediate result of the withdrawal from population centers in 2004 was not a 
decrease in violence, but an increase, as U.S. forces ceded territory to Sunni and Shia 
militias.  As U.S. forces patrolled from more remote FOBs they began to use heavier 
armored vehicles to protect themselves from the increased improvised explosive device 
(IED) threats on the “commutes” to their sectors.  This distance and armor increasingly 
isolated the soldiers from the population and made it difficult for them to control the level 
of violence and maintain an enduring presence in Iraqi population centers.  The concern 
for U.S. casualties also introduced a trend of risk aversion among U.S. units; some were 
unwilling or unable to completely secure their sectors operating out of FOBs.  The net 
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result of the isolation of U.S. forces from the Iraqi people, the general level of insecurity 
from this force posture, and the risk-averse attitude it created, was a growing irrelevance 
of U.S. forces on the course of the Iraq War.141     
 Casey’s response to the difficulty in controlling the level of violence was to focus 
even more on the transfer of security control to Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) so that they 
could take over security operations while U.S. forces continued consolidation for 
eventual withdrawal.  Rushing ill-prepared ISF units into the offensives of 2004, the 
sectarian composition of the police and the army, and the overall failure of the ISF to 
match the insurgency in capabilities, made this strategy increasingly difficult to sustain in 
2005 and 2006.  Since the Iraqi Security Forces, and the entire Iraqi government, were 
heavily infiltrated and intimidated by Shia extremists, the larger Iraqi Sunni community 
viewed them and the U.S. as implacable enemies.  This drove Sunnis to support violent 
Sunni extremist groups like Al Qaeda in Iraq to an even greater extent, inflaming 
sectarian tensions and the anti-U.S. insurgency.  Casey’s 2006 offensives to secure 
Baghdad - Operations Together Forward I and II - actually escalated sectarian violence 
by inserting Shia-dominated ISF outposts into previously denied Sunni territory.  This 
enabled the Shia extremists to extend their reach into Sunni-dominated neighborhoods 
with the collusion and acquiescence of Iraqi Security Forces.  Rather than allowing the 
U.S. to withdraw from Iraq under conditions of relative security, the singular focus on 
transfer of authority from U.S. forces to Iraqi forces regardless of capability or sectarian 
bias, endangered the fate of the entire U.S. effort in Iraq.142    
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 The Transition strategy was predicated on the existence of a legitimate Iraqi 
government and a minimally capable Iraqi security apparatus.  Based upon Casey’s 
observation from Bosnia that the military “can’t make people love each other” and his 
demonstrated reluctance to intervene in the political aspects of the war, the Transition 
strategy became rigid and unable to adapt to the changing dynamics of the conflict.  By 
not addressing the sectarian policies of the government and the military, the U.S. became 
viewed by many Sunni’s as at best irrelevant, or at worst a Shia partisan in the sectarian 
war.  Since Transition relied so heavily on the Iraqi government and ISF legitimacy, U.S. 
forces were constrained from making long-term local accommodations or taking 
advantage of local power dynamics.  The U.S. was unable to commit as a credible partner 
or neutral actor in the war.  Any local tactical development that appeared to weaken or 
undermine the Iraqi government, such as empowering traditional tribal leaders or 
allowing Sunni groups to defend their own neighborhoods, was rejected out of hand by 
Casey’s headquarters as violating the Transition strategy.  This issue of sectarianism at 
the highest levels of the government of Iraq and its security forces had tremendous 
implications for the viability of the entire Transition enterprise.  This remained an 
unexamined contradiction of this strategy throughout Casey’s tenure as commander in 
Iraq.143    
 Finally, the singular drive for the rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq 
precluded the establishment of baseline security.  With its forces isolated from the Iraqi 
population and failing to address the sectarian nature of the security services and 
government, U.S. forces were increasingly irrelevant to the course of the war.  Casey 
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found himself in the unique position of simultaneously not being able to make credible 
commitments to reconcile with Sunni insurgents while also not exercising any leverage 
over his erstwhile Shia allies in the Iraqi government and military.  Since his strategy was 
so clearly directed at a rapid withdrawal from the conflict, no one, not tribal leaders, Shia 
politicians and soldiers, or Sunni insurgents, took seriously the U.S. commitment to long-
term security and stability in Iraq.  The Transition strategy prevented the reinforcement of 
tactical successes, as successful operations in Tal ‘Afar and Ramadi in 2005 and 2006 
were used as opportunities to accelerate the withdrawal of U.S. forces.  
C.  Responses to Dissonance  
Non-Progressive Adaptation 
 There is a powerful assumption within innovation literature144 that portrays 
organizational change in the military as a sort of forward march of increasingly effective 
progress.   The progressive element of “organizational learning” arguments central to 
James Russell’s Innovation, Transformation, and War  and Steven Metz’s monograph, 
Decisionmaking in OIF: The Strategic Shift of 2007 is based on evidence that through 
multiple deployments and experimentation, U.S. units simply got better in the Iraq War.  
In some instances, particularly when army units had exceptional leadership and were far 
from the central headquarters, this logic of progressive adaption holds true.  Significantly, 
all of Russell’s case studies are based on army and marine battalions in the relatively 
remote Ninewah and Anbar provinces, with none drawn from the capital, Baghdad.  Metz 
and Russell are not necessarily wrong in their argument; there was substantial innovation 
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in parts of the Iraq War, specifically on the periphery of the war.  However, examples of 
successful innovation, such as the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (3rd ACR) in the Tal 
‘Afar campaign in 2005 and the 1st Brigade of the 1st Armored Division (1/1 AD) in 
Ramadi in 2006, do not prove that there was a virtuous cycle of tactical innovation and 
adaptation throughout all army units in the war.  The opposite result of successful 
adaptation is also a likely and logical result:  non-progressive adaptation.  That is to say 
that certain units and leaders regressed in their tactical adaptation; they failed to 
successfully adapt to the challenges they faced and increasingly turned to force protection 
measures and firepower to compensate for their inability to quell the insurgency    
 Determining success or failure can be a contentious and complex issue with 
regard to tactical performance during the Iraq War.  The examples in this section are 
based on a narrow interpretation of success, which is considered to be an effective 
reduction in violence and the establishment of baseline security.   Many army units were 
placed in impossible situations where success may have been all but impossible to 
achieve due to the constraints of limited resources, strategy, geographic location, and of 
course, enemy action.  However, most army units sought to serve effectively and 
accomplish their mission, as they understood it, to the best of their abilities.   The reality 
of war, no less true in counterinsurgency, is that good intentions are not enough to ensure 
success.  In many cases units and officers in the Iraq War failed to achieve success as it is 
defined here.     
 In contrast to the successful cases of innovation in the 3rd ACR in Tal ‘Afar and 
1/1 AD in Ramadi, four distinct trends among combat units in Iraq demonstrate the 
potential for non-progressive adaptation at the tactical level: the rejection of 
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counterinsurgency tactics by senior commanders, the collapse of discipline under extreme 
pressure, the escalation of violence in the face of high casualties, and finally a general 
pattern of risk aversion. The first two examples are drawn from the experience of the 
101st Airborne Division in 2005 and 2006.  Significantly, this was the same division 
commanded by General Petraeus to wide acclaim in the 2003 stabilization campaign in 
Mosul.  The fact that units from an elite and experienced division could demonstrate a 
form of tactical regression or “unlearning,” demonstrates that linear, progressive 
organizational innovation arguments do not capture the entire picture of organizational 
change in the Iraq War. 
Successful Innovation 
Tal ‘Afar, Iraq 2005:                                                                                                        
              “You need to stop thinking strategically.”145 
 Colonel McMaster assumed command of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment146 in 
2004 after serving on the CENTCOM staff.  He immediately revolutionized the unit’s 
preparation for its next Iraq deployment by focusing on light infantry skills; training 
every soldier as a rifleman first and specialist second; adopting a counterinsurgency 
mindset characterized by McMaster’s oft-repeated mantra, “Don’t do the enemy’s work;” 
emphasizing Arabic language skills at the small unit level; and discarding traditional 
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mechanized combat training for Iraq-specific scenarios featuring Arabic-speaking role 
players.147    
 While serving in South Baghdad in 2005, the 3rd ACR was sent to retake the city 
of Tal ‘Afar148 which was a center of insurgent resistance and training, fueling the 
growing violence in the strategic northern city of Mosul less than 50 miles away.149 
McMaster initiated a cautious reconnaissance around Tal ‘Afar and developed a 
campaign plan that journalist George Packer characterized as the “anti-Fallujah,” in stark 
contrast to earlier large scale clearance operations in 2004 in Fallujah, Najaf, and 
Baghdad’s Sadr City.150  Operation Restoring Rights was a jointly conceived plan 
between the U.S. 3rd ACR, elements of the Iraqi Army 3rd Division, and local Tal ‘Afar 
officials, specifically the mayor who suggested isolating the entire town with an earthen 
berm.   
 1000 U.S. troops and nearly 8000 Iraqi Security Forces conducted a phased 
clearance operation that began with securing major routes around the city, an effort to 
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reduce insurgent support zones outside the town, and gaining control of the population 
through secured entry control points at the breaks in the berm.  Most residents relocated 
to the homes of family members outside of Tal ‘Afar or moved into temporary refugee 
camps provided by the U.S. forces.  This effort was followed by the development of deep 
local knowledge of tribal power dynamics.  After four months of preparation U.S. and 
Iraqi forces retook the city with overwhelming force, but did not level the city.  Tal ‘Afar 
was then held by U.S., Iraqi Army, and Iraqi Police forces from small, joint outposts 
located throughout the city in local neighborhoods.  These forces immediately began U.S. 
and Iraqi government funded reconstruction and humanitarian assistance projects to 
restore the city.151  
 McMaster’s overriding emphasis throughout this operation was on securing the 
population of Tal ‘Afar as a neutral actor.  He had concluded that the U.S. must lead and 
closely supervise all Iraqi Security Forces because of their actual, and perceived by the 
Sunni population, infiltration by Shia extremists and sectarian bias.152  Lieutenant 
Colonel Yingling, the 3rd ACR Deputy Commander, recounted the example of an Iraqi 
unit acting as a sectarian partisan in Tal ‘Afar. “We had introduced into the city, an MoI 
[Ministry of Interior] special police commando brigade [the Wolf Brigade], and these 
were not disciplined forces…we asked for their removal…and got it…because they were 
creating insecurity…” The realization that the Iraqi Security Forces were not able to act 
as a neutral party to quell the Sunni insurgency put McMaster’s successful Tal ‘Afar 
campaign strategy at odds with General Casey’s “Transition” strategy.  An exchange 
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between an army brigadier general from Multi-National Security Training Command-Iraq 
(MNSTC-I)153 and Colonel McMaster revealed this strategic tension.  The general chided 
McMaster for his lack of understanding of General Casey’s strategy and that doing too 
much for the Iraqis, particularly the Iraqi Security Forces, undermined Iraqi success and 
jeopardized the U.S. exit strategy.  McMaster responded that, “It is unclear to me how a 
higher degree of passivity would advance our mission.”154  George Packer described 
Operation Restoring Rights as a success, “despite an absence of guidance from senior 
civilian and military leaders” and described McMaster and other tactical innovators as, 
“rebels against and incoherent strategy.”155  
Ramadi, Iraq 2006:                                                                                                           
                        “When you don’t have a horse, ride a dog.” 156 
 Colonel Sean MacFarland and his 1st Brigade Combat Team of the 1st Armored 
Division (1/1 AD)  tour of duty in Ramadi in 2006 corresponded with the critical Sunni 
tribal realignment in Anbar province, known as the Anbar Awakening to the Americans 
and as “sahwa” to the Iraqis.  Colonel MacFarland replaced McMaster in Tal ‘Afar in 
early 2006 but was pulled out in June and ordered to take over responsibility for the 
provincial capital Ramadi.  MacFarland and his Marine Corps superiors received little 
strategic guidance from MNF-I headquarters for this operation, as it was consumed with 
spiraling levels of sectarian violence in the capital.  Ramadi was easily one of the most 
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dangerous cities in all of Iraq in 2006, with wide swaths of the city openly controlled by 
Sunni extremists and Al Qaeda in Iraq, who had declared Ramadi the capital of its new 
Iraqi “caliphate.”157 
 It was within this atmosphere of spiraling violence in Baghdad and apparent 
stalemate in Anbar, that Colonel MacFarland and his staff planned to retake the city.  In a 
2008 article for Military Review, Colonel MacFarland and one of his operations officers, 
Major Niel Smith, authored an article about their experiences.  MacFarland described his 
campaign plan as similar to the “Island hopping” campaign of the U.S. in the Pacific in 
World War II. “We decided to employ a tactic we had borrowed from the 3d Armored 
Cavalry Regiment and used successfully in Tal ‘Afar: the combat outpost…a constant 
presence in disputed neighborhoods.”158   
 MacFarland adapted the Tal ‘Afar campaign plan to the local conditions of 
Ramadi.  1/1AD attempted to isolate the city and reduce support zones on the outskirts, 
but Ramadi was significantly larger than Tal ‘Afar, and a berm was simply not feasible.  
MacFarland adjusted by using combat outposts, not as a post-combat stability measure as 
in Tal ‘Afar, but as an offensive weapon against the insurgency.  1/1 AD became experts 
at rapid construction and occupation of outposts in insurgent dominated neighborhoods.  
Once an area came under control of U.S. forces, MacFarland rapidly moved into 
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reconstruction and assistance and sought to recruit local Iraqis to serve as police in their 
own neighborhoods.  Development assistance was funneled to cooperative local leaders 
as a reward for cooperation.  Areas that became relatively safe would be transitioned to 
Iraqi control, with close U.S. supervision to prevent sectarian tension between the 
majority Shia army and the Sunni residents, and the combat units would “hop” to another 
contested area.159    
 MacFarland identified two critical elements of his brigade’s approach to the 
seemingly impossible task of retaking Ramadi from the insurgency.  First, he identified a 
genuine and credible commitment to local leaders as critical: 
 Instead of telling them that we would leave soon and they must assume 
 responsibility for their own security, we told them that we would stay as long as 
 necessary to defeat the terrorists.  That was the message they had been waiting to 
 hear.  As long as they perceived us as mere interlopers, they dared not throw in 
 their lot with ours.  When they began to think of us as reliable partners, their 
 attitudes began to change.160  
Second, he committed to allowing locally recruited Iraqis to serve as police in their own 
neighborhoods, and he used combat outposts to consolidate security gains.  Allowing 
local police to serve in their own neighborhoods generated resistance from 1/1 AD’s 
higher headquarters as the local police initiative was viewed as arming a tribal militia that 
might challenge the Government of Iraq in the future.  However, MacFarland argued 
strongly for the tactic and was allowed to proceed with his plan.161   
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 MacFarland and Smith called the emergence of Sheikh Sittar abu Risha and his 
anti-Al Qaeda tribal council as the “Tipping Point” in the battle for Ramadi.  Sheikh 
Sittar and 50 other Ramadi-area sheikhs declared the sahwa or awakening on September 
9, 2006.  This tribal realignment against Al Qaeda was secured by the Battle of Sufia in 
which Al Qaeda staged a large scale assault on the Abu Soda clan in an attempt to break 
the nascent awakening movement.  Instead of waiting on the sidelines of this battle as 
many U.S. units had done in the past, 1/1 AD units attacked the Al Qaeda fighters with 
close air support and artillery fire until a mechanized relief convoy reached the embattled 
clan.  This overt act of support for the awakening and the decimation of the Al Qaeda 
fighters cemented the relationship between the Sahwa tribes and U.S. forces.162   
 This “pattern of change” within army and marine units that took advantage of the 
awakening movement in Anbar was characterized by a pragmatic approach to seeking 
local solutions to local problems, an understanding of tribal and clan power dynamics, 
and a recognition of the realignment between tribal interests and U.S. security 
interests.163  In the summer of 2006 the U.S. believed that Anbar was lost and Al Qaeda 
believed that it was ascendant in the province, openly controlling its largest city.  The 
ensuing spread of the Anbar Awakening throughout the province in late 2006 and early 
2007 resulted in a complete reversal of fortunes for both Al Qaeda and the U.S.  This 
movement was the inspiration and the model that General Petraeus would seize upon in 
2007 and institute all over Iraq as the Sons of Iraq.164 
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Unsuccessful Adaptation 
 The impression that most units engaged in productive innovation can provide a 
misleading view of change.  The lack of a coherent strategy in Iraq caused many army 
leaders not to engage in a virtuous cycle of innovation free from the restrictions of higher 
headquarters interference, but to fall back on the skills that they knew best amidst the 
ambiguity and uncertainty of Iraq: high-intensity combat.  Just as evolution isn’t always 
progressive in the sense of positive adaptation, neither is military adaptation in wartime 
always progressive.  Not all units reacted to the difficult tactical challenges and the 
ambiguous nature of Iraq as optimally as the 3rd ACR in Tal ‘Afar or 1/1 AD in Ramadi.  
In many cases the dissonance generated by the Transition strategy resulted in distinctly 
suboptimal outcomes: units collapsed under pressure, units and leaders focused solely on 
their own protection to the detriment of the mission, or units engaged in increasingly 
inappropriate tactical reactions that created a spiral of mutually reinforcing mistrust and 
violence between U.S. units and the people that they were ostensibly tasked to secure.       
Rejection of Counterinsurgency Tactics                                                                                                            
 Colonel Michael Steele, commander of the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 101st 
Airborne Division (3/101), was an experienced officer and veteran of the 1993 Battle of 
Mogadishu.  He was also an unapologetic adherent to high-intensity combat and killing 
as the essence of warfare.  In speeches delivered to his soldiers at Fort Campbell and in 
Samarra, Iraq, Steele emphasized that victory was achieved by “getting violent the 
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fastest.”165  Although escalation of force is a common and logical aspect of high-intensity 
combat, it can prove detrimental to the overall mission in small war operations.166   
 Steele was not unique among many in the army in focusing on the enemy, but he 
was unique in the extreme manner in which he executed his mission.  He held 
counterinsurgency theorists and reconstruction advocates in utter disdain and encouraged 
his subordinate commanders to post “kill boards” that recorded the number of Iraqis 
killed during the deployment.  Also, not unusual among army officers by 2006, he held 
almost all Iraqis in contempt.  Again, he took this distrust and lack of cultural 
understanding to an extreme level.167   
 In May of 2006, Colonel Steele received a written reprimand from General 
Chiarelli, effectively ending his career, for his contributing role in the deaths of three 
detainees at the hands of four soldiers from his brigade in a raid in Thar Thar outside of 
Samarra.  Steele was reprimanded specifically for “misrepresenting the Rules of 
Engagement” to his soldiers.  Four soldiers were convicted in a court-martial of shooting 
three detained Iraqis and then covering up the crime.  Several soldiers involved in the 
operation cited specific instructions from Colonel Steele to kill all males of fighting age 
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on the objective, an allegation Steele denied.    Frustration with the progress of the war, 
the contradictions of strategy, and the perceived disloyalty of Iraqi Security Forces, all 
led to growing resentment by U.S. soldiers toward most Iraqis, civilian and insurgent 
alike. Colonel Steele’s rejection of counterinsurgency tactics and his intellectual 
conception of war as simple violence, while extreme, was not outside of the dominant 
cultural norms of the army.  Just as the leadership of McMaster and MacFarland enabled 
their units to successfully innovate, the leadership of Steele fostered the ineffective use of 
excessive force in an example of non-progressive adaptation.168   
Collapse of Discipline                                                                                                                                                         
 On March 6, 2006 in the Mahmudiayah area south of Baghdad, four U.S. soldiers 
from Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 502nd Parachute Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne 
Division (1-502 PIR) committed one of the worst war crimes of the Iraq War.  These 
soldiers left their checkpoint and raped a teenage girl, murdered her entire family, and 
then set the corpses on fire to cover up the crime.  Journalist Jim Frederick, in his 
excellent account of this tragedy, Black Hearts, detailed how, “the travails of Bravo 
Company are a study in the tactical consequences that flow from a flawed strategy.” 169 
The 700 man 1-502 PIR infantry battalion was given security responsibility for over 300 
square miles of the “Triangle of Death,” a Sunni insurgent stronghold south of Baghdad.  
In a manner similar to Colonel MacFarland’s 1/1 AD, this battalion was given vague 
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orders that amounted to “save the day.” 1-502 PIR’s specific tasks were to retake the 
insurgent strongholds throughout their sector, promote local reconciliation and 
reconstruction, and train local Iraqi Army units.170     
 The large land area, the dispersed, hostile population, and the entrenched 
insurgency in Mahmudiyah led to confusion at all levels of this unit between the missions 
of capturing/killing insurgents and securing the population.  This was a tension that was 
never resolved.  The battalion occupied small outposts, but these were not the same as the 
strongly held Tal ‘Afar stability outposts or the offensive firebases of Ramadi.  The 1-502 
PIR outpost plan suffered from over-dispersion with platoons spread thinly at static, 
exposed checkpoints that immobilized the unit by the sheer number of locations and 
subsequent manpower requirements needed to man them.  It was from one of these 
isolated checkpoints that four U.S. soldiers slipped away to commit their crimes in March 
2006.171    
 This battalion was spread dangerously thin and faced daily rocket and mortar 
attacks on their camps, small arms ambushes nearly every other day, and encountered 
over 900 improvised explosive devices.  The battalion lost 21 soldiers killed in action, 
many more wounded, and over 40 percent of the battalion was treated for mental health 
problems during the tour.172  Frederick characterizes the battalion command as utterly 
dysfunctional.  The company commanders did not get along with the battalion 
commander and particularly Bravo Company –the most dispersed Company and the unit 
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of the four war criminals- felt isolated physically and emotionally from its sister units and 
its parent command.  Overall, the unit had extremely poor relations with the Iraqis who 
felt the U.S. soldiers were violent and arrogant, while the U.S. soldiers believed that 
nearly all Iraqis were the enemy.173   
 In contrast to the case of Colonel Steele, where one commander’s philosophy of 
war directly contributed to war crimes, the case of the collapse of discipline within this 
battalion was a direct result of the impossible task that it was given.  Isolated, among an 
extremely hostile population, this unit was stretched to the breaking point and discipline 
collapsed, resulting in one of the worst war crimes of the Iraq War and a strategic defeat 
for the U.S. The poor command climate that Frederick clearly illustrated did not help, but 
the chronic lack of resources, lack of manpower, and lack of appropriate tactics created 
an unbridgeable rift between the soldiers of this battalion and the people that they were 
intended to secure.  While it is debatable whether or not the commanders of this battalion 
could have achieved results similar to the 3rd ACR or 1/1AD, this unit suffered from a 
task that was simply too large and difficult to accomplish.  Even though the 1-502 PIR 
used methods that were similar to elements of the Tal ‘Afar and Ramadi campaigns, 
overall, they engaged in non-progressive adaptation that was an organizational regression 
from their division’s successful adaptation in the 2003 Mosul campaign.  
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Escalation of Violence                                                                                                                                 
 The case of the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment from the 1st Infantry Division 
in Germany shows the long-term impact of the dissonance created at the tactical level by 
the Transition strategy.  1-26 IN, known as the Blue Spaders, moved into Baghdad in the 
midst of the failing Operation Together Forward in August 2006.  In contrast to the 
dysfunctions of the command group of 1-502 PIR in Mahmudiyah, 1-26 IN was a tight-
knit battalion with an extremely well respected and experienced commander.174  The Blue 
Spaders were assigned the Sunni stronghold of Adhamiyah district on the eastern banks 
of the Tigris River where the locals were openly hostile to the U.S. forces and the Shia-
dominated Iraqi Security Forces.175  
 The soldiers of 1-26 IN occupied one combat outpost in Adhamiyah while the rest 
of the battalion lived on large FOBs southeast of their sectors.  The battalion lost 11 
soldiers killed in action by explosively formed penetrator (EFP) IEDs simply travelling 
from their FOBs to their neighborhoods.  The battalion faced a range of challenges: its 
Battalion Commander lost his 15 year old son to a heart attack in Germany and did not 
return to the battalion, convoys were regularly hit by IEDs, the battalion’s area was a 
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complex mix of Sunni insurgent strongholds, JAM-owned neighborhoods, and mixed-
sect battlegrounds.176   
 By the beginning of the surge in February 2007, 1-26 IN added the occupation of 
small Joint Security Station outposts and the construction of the controversial Adhamiyah 
wall project to its missions.  Once the wall was completed and Iraqi Army soldiers 
controlled the two main entry points, Sunni fighters were no longer able to target Shia in 
other neighborhoods and turned their attention to fighting the army inside of the wall.  In 
the space of a few weeks the Blue Spaders lost two 30 ton Bradley Fighting Vehicles and 
their crews to homemade explosives packed under the roads of the neighborhoods.  The 
second Bradley lost on June 21, 2007 was a breaking point for this battalion.  During one 
day a Bradley Fighting Vehicle, its crew of four, and an Iraqi interpreter were lost, a 
rocket propelled grenade (RPG) attack on the security perimeter around the Bradley 
killed an MP, and the Battalion Chaplain’s humvee was hit by an IED, wounding three.  
This was also the day that the Battalion Commander was informed of his son’s death in 
Germany and left the battalion. 177  
 The events of June 21st combined with the accumulated strain of the entire 
deployment led to what reporter Kelly Kennedy described as a “mutiny” in one of the 
battalion’s infantry platoons.  These soldiers and their NCO leadership refused to conduct 
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a patrol from Camp Taji to Adhamiyah.  This mutiny resulted in all of the squad leaders 
in the platoon being reassigned and new leadership being brought in to take over.178  This 
mutiny and the battalion’s overall tactical approach demonstrated that by the spring of 
2007 this unit was fully isolated from the population and ineffective at quelling the 
insurgency.  By this point most soldiers in the Blue Spaders hated Iraqis, only patrolled in 
heavily armored vehicles, were as a group extremely fatalistic about their individual 
prospects for survival, were very aggressive with civilians, and showed clear signs of 
exhaustion.179    
 The change associated with the surge was not simply a switch to be thrown that 
immediately changed everything in the Iraq War.  Units whose tours straddled the Casey 
and Petraeus eras had difficulty adapting to the shift in approach.180  The men of the Blue 
Spaders were not evil or war criminals, they were simply exhausted from occupying too 
large an area, with too few troops, and experiencing too many casualties.  The loss of 
comrades is difficult for soldiers to endure, but it is even more corrosive when significant 
losses are sustained to little purpose -  just trying to get from their camps to their highly 
volatile area of operations.   
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 Because of the difficult challenges it faced,181 1-26 IN allowed the insurgency to 
effectively separate them from the population; reversing the counterinsurgent’s 
imperative to separate the insurgent from the people. The lack of resources, manpower, 
and consolidation on large FOBs drove the Blue Spaders to augment their lack of 
numbers with armor, firepower, and aggression. The high level of enemy contact and the 
hostility of the locals drove the battalion to first patrol mostly in humvees and then as 
insurgent attacks intensified, they patrolled in Bradleys.  The cycle of violence and 
mistrust escalated with each new attack.  At each point of escalation, 1-26 IN moved 
further from mutual identification and understanding with the populace.  As the 
Americans appeared more and more like wanton, faceless occupiers, the local Iraqis were 
less likely to assist them against the insurgency.182    
Risk Aversion                                                                                                     
 The consolidation of U.S. forces on large, fortified Forward Operating Bases that 
occurred throughout Iraq from 2004 and into 2006 had the opposite effect on the 
insurgency from the one intended.  Conceived as a way to both remove the appearance of 
an occupation and limit U.S. casualties, this plan enabled the insurgents and militias to 
seize control of large areas of Iraq.  The precipitous withdrawal of U.S. forces exposed 
the ill-prepared ISF as either hopelessly incompetent or thoroughly penetrated by militias.   
Additionally, U.S. forces cut themselves off from accurate local intelligence and were 
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slow to realize the changing nature of the war from an insurgency to a sectarian civil war.  
Journalist George Packer characterized the FOBs in 2006 as both a statement by the army 
“that counterinsurgency is just too hard” and as a suggestion of “American irrelevance” 
in the Iraq War.183   
 At the tactical level, FOBs had a way of incentivizing passivity and risk aversion.  
Designed to protect soldiers, the FOBs increased their risk to IED attack since all routes 
in and out of the FOB were highly predictable.  It also introduced predictability into the 
timing of patrols since most revolved around breakfast, lunch, and dinner service at the 
massive contractor-run dining facilities.  They were also a drain on time, supplies, 
personnel, and initiative.  Large FOBs required extensive supply convoys from Kuwait to 
travel on major routes which required IED clearance and security.  FOBs were located on 
the periphery of most population centers and many units had long transit times to reach 
their sectors.  FOBs sapped valuable manpower from combat units for security and other 
“FOB taxes.”   Finally, FOBs robbed tactical units of the initiative in the war.  Force 
protection of their own personnel became the overriding concern for many as U.S. 
fortunes continued to decline in the Iraq War.  Thus protection of U.S. soldiers, not the 
population, became the highest priority of the Transition strategy.  The unintended 
consequence of this concern with force protection was the paradox of where to draw the 
line between protecting the force and accomplishing the mission.  Taken to its logical 
extreme, the best course of action was not to conduct any risky or dangerous mission, or 
even to not patrol at all. 
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 In 2006 a military police company commander was interviewed by a New York 
Times journalist in South Baghdad.  Captain Stephanie Bagley was a West Point graduate 
and a member of a family of military officers.  Initially, she stated that she was optimistic 
about her mission to train and assist local Iraqi Police in establishing security, but rising 
sectarian violence, militia assassinations of police officers, and the failure of U.S. 
security operations left her exhausted.  Captain Bagley stated that, “I just want to get 
everyone home…I’m just not willing to lose another soldier.”  She banned foot patrols in 
dangerous neighborhoods by her troops and restricted travel off of the FOB to essential 
missions only.184  Captain Bagley described her tour from December 2005 to December 
2006 as, “a frustrating year…We all want to get out of here.”185  
 These are common, if underreported, sentiments from a commander in Iraq during 
this time period.  Many commanders were concerned with “getting all of their men home 
alive,” but few would go so far as to publicly admit defeat or that one was just playing for 
time until redeployment.  Captain Bagley’s statements demonstrated a capable and 
motivated commander deciding that the risks to her troops’ safety posed by a 
deteriorating security situation outweighed the need to accomplish the mission.  By 
declaring dangerous neighborhoods off limits, she was essentially ceding territory to the 
insurgency.  This is not to say that this commander was a coward or negligent, but that 
she was simply trying to mediate what she saw as the contradictory requirements of her 
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mission: train the Iraqi Security Forces or protect her own troops.  It is clear from this 
example that she chose the latter.   
 A widespread impression among junior officers in 2005 and 2006 was that many 
U.S. commanders, even at the highest levels, were more concerned with force protection 
than winning; just trying to get through their tours without making waves.  In The 
Gamble, Tom Ricks quoted a young U.S. officer, Captain Zachary Martin, who described 
U.S. posture in 2006 as, “reactive…With our fortified bases and our few secured major 
supply routes linking them, we have immobilized ourselves and cut ourselves off from 
the battlefield –the populace of Iraq.”186 A field grade officer and Iraq veteran cited 
“personal experience” in the Small Wars Journal Council that he knew of, “units that 
work[ed] deals with the insurgents.  ‘We won’t leave the FOB as long as you do not 
rocket or mortar our FOB.’ Yes this did happen and it took 90-120 days for someone to 
figure out that this was taking place.”187  
 It is not clear from the evidence available that the event described above was a 
widespread occurrence, however, it was perceived as widespread among many officers 
with service in Iraq.  What is clear is that many officers, like Captain Bagley, simply 
ceded territory to the insurgency because of danger, lack of troops, or inability to provide 
an enduring security presence in their sectors.  The brigade commander who preceded 
Colonel MacFarland’s 1/1 AD was clear that he did not have the capability to establish 
control over large parts of Ramadi.  In fact, this colonel and other marine officers familiar 
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with Ramadi counseled Colonel MacFarland to avoid certain areas of the city because the 
insurgents controlled them outright.188  The National Guard unit that the 1-502 PIR 
replaced in Mahmudiyah did not patrol widely outside of the central villages during most 
of its deployment either.189  As the Iraq War continued and commanders grappled with 
the contradictions of the Transition strategy, many “voted with their feet” and avoided 
dangerous or risky tactics even if they were essential to mission accomplishment.    
Tal ‘Afar Revisited: Unreinforced Success 
 The 3rd ACR’s campaign to retake Tal ‘Afar was a much heralded success in the 
Iraq War.  McMaster’s campaign was cited by President Bush in a March 2006 speech as 
evidence of progress and inspired Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice’s description of 
U.S. strategy in Iraq as “Clear, Hold, Build”190 in U.S. Senate testimony.  While publicly 
lauded by Multi-National Forces-Iraq commander, General George Casey, it was 
privately a point of contention for both Casey and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld; 
neither of them fully supported a “Clear, Hold, Build” conception.  Their desire was for 
an immediate transition to Iraqi control and rapid U.S. withdrawal.191   
 General Casey personally awarded Colonel McMaster a Bronze Star Medal for 
his success in Tal ‘Afar, an honor that he reserved only for his top commanders.  
Journalists David Cloud and Greg Jaffe reported that after the award ceremony, in a short 
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private meeting between the two officers, that Casey congratulated McMaster on his 
success, but counseled him to be a better team player and learn to “take no for an answer” 
from his superiors.  This was in reaction to tension between McMaster and General 
Casey’s headquarters over unfilled troop requests and resistance to McMaster’s tactics.  
The message was clear: McMaster’s campaign was successful, but its tactics would not 
be replicated or translated into a larger strategic success.192   
 As Tom Ricks observed in 2006, “McMaster’s approach in Tal ‘Afar would prove 
to be yet another road not taken…much of the U.S. military in Iraq was pursuing a 
different course.  Instead of living among the people…they were closing smaller outposts 
and withdrawing to a handful of big super FOBs.”193  An army officer described the 
impact of U.S. withdrawal from the city of Samarra in late 2005: “the junior officers were 
left scratching their heads…as to why they fought for a year to restore some level of 
normalcy to the city only to leave and hand it back over to terrorists and insurgents.” he 
continued, “That was the joy of the FOB consolidation strategy…Let’s not secure the 
population.  Let’s wall ourselves into these giant concrete garrison paradises, shop at the 
PX, and eat at Pizza Hut.”194  Another officer criticized the “utter lack of a strategic plan 
under Casey and Abizaid.  He stated that while McMaster and the 3rd ACR were 
implementing the Tal ‘Afar plan in 2005 …the overall strategic thrust of the U.S. Army 
in Iraq was withdrawal to FOBs.”195  Former brigade commander and Petraeus aide, 
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Colonel Peter Mansoor, observed that the “lack of a coherent campaign plan left division 
and brigade combat team commanders to fashion their own solutions to the tactical 
challenges they faced” with most adapting to the chaos by using, “offensive operations in 
a vain attempt to destroy the growing insurgency.”196  
 Lieutenant Colonel Gibson,197 an infantry battalion commander attached to 
McMaster’s 3rd ACR, critiqued the entire Casey strategy in a 2006 Military Review 
article.  Based upon his experiences in Tal ‘Afar he stated that: “We need an integrated 
strategy that effectively ties together military, political/institutional, economic, and social 
lines of operation and that has identifiable, pragmatic steps and milestones.  And we need 
one soon.  Considering what is at stake, we must not fail.”  Under 3rd ACR, his men lived 
in dispersed outposts and were a constant feature of their neighborhoods rather than being 
consolidated on large FOBs.  Gibson believed that he had found an effective tactical 
model in the Tal ‘Afar campaign, but that the U.S. desperately needed an associated 
strategy for success at the highest political and military levels.198  
 McMaster’s success in Tal ‘Afar was based on a nearly point-by-point refutation 
of Casey’s master plan of FOB consolidation and rapid transfer of security responsibility 
to the Iraqis.  3rd ACR determined that these measures would have failed because FOBs 
prevented true population security and independent Iraqi Security Forces increased 
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insecurity due to their actual, and perceived, sectarian partisanship.  Whether anyone at 
Multi National Forces-Iraq headquarters appreciated how much the 3rd ACR’s Tal ‘Afar 
campaign revealed the flaws in its Iraq War strategy is unclear.  What is clear is that 
despite the fame of this victory and its national level visibility, the success of Operation 
Restoring Rights remained an unexamined, unreinforced, and isolated success amid the 
declining fortunes of the overall Iraq War effort.  Despite the success of McMaster’s 
innovative campaign, its long term impact on the war was minimal.  Without the 
reinforcement of local tactical innovation by General Casey’s command, substantial 
change in the war was impossible.      
D.  The Institutional Disconnect 
 Augmenting the variation in tactical unit responses to the challenges of the Iraq 
War was the response of the institutional army, based in the U.S., to the challenges of the 
war. Rather than engaging in progressive innovation, many senior leaders of the 
institutional army retrenched into the established tenets of the post Vietnam narrative, 
effectively ignoring the Iraq War.  A review of articles and the introductory columns of 
the Armor journal199 from 2005 until 2007200 provides a specific and vivid example of the 
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 The Armor Journal is the official professional journal of the U.S. Army armor and cavalry communities 
(Armor is one of two army branches tasked with direct fire confrontation with the enemy, the other being 
the much larger infantry branch). The period from 2005 until 2008 was primarily the tenure of two 
commanding generals of the Armor Center, Major Generals Terry L. Tucker and Robert M. Williams.  
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be strategic thinkers, but the Armor Center is a tactically focused command; concerned with training, 
equipping and education armor and cavalry units as well as soldiers and officers.  Neither is it a combat or 
operational command, as it does not control deployable units.  Also, the amount of effort that these generals 
dedicated to arguing the continued efficacy of the tank in war seems unnecessary since the overwhelming 
majority of Armor readers are themselves armor officers and soldiers and are well indoctrinated in the 
utility of their own specialty.   
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disconnect between senior institutional army leaders and the junior officer veterans of the 
war in Iraq.  Rather than focus on innovations and adaptations required for the Iraq War, 
commanding generals of the Armor Center were more concerned with internal army 
bureaucratic politics over Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s “Transformation” reforms, 
funding for major armor weapons systems, and in the surge era, the narrative of lost 
armor “core competencies.”    
 The Armor Center generals seemed painfully slow to adapt from a Cold War 
mindset and were overwhelmingly concerned with lost professional competencies -tank 
gunnery and large scale mechanized combat- during an active war needing very few of 
these skills.  In the midst of actual, ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, these officers 
were more concerned with potentially losing a high-intensity battle to an unidentified 
state military, rather than prevailing in the current conflicts.  With the Iraq War as the 
main theater of operation for the vast majority of armor and cavalry units and leaders, the 
high profile of several influential armor officers, and the Armor journal’s tactical focus, 
one would expect a rich and detailed treatment of that war and its conduct on the pages of 
this journal.  As an indication of the institutional disconnect, this simply was not the case 
in Armor from 2005 through most of 2007. 
 In the January/February 2005 issue of Armor, Major General Terry Tucker, 
commanding general of the Armor Center, stated in his introductory column that, 
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 In the period considered, the armor community mainly deployed to Iraq, with very few units 
participating in the war in Afghanistan.  Several of the most famous counterinsurgency innovators and 
theorists of this time were armor officers: Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl wrote an influential history of 
counterinsurgency and was a primary author of General Petraeus’ counterinsurgency manual; Colonel Peter 
Mansoor was another counterinsurgency proponent and senior aide to General Petraeus; Colonel H.R. 
McMaster was a famous Gulf War veteran, author of a popular history of the Joint Chiefs and Vietnam, and 
architect of the Tal Afar campaign; and finally, Colonel Sean MacFarland was the commander who retook 
Ramadi and supported the Anbar Awakening.   
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“Currently we are engaged in a counterinsurgency campaign…” but then discussed 
armor’s purpose as conventional, mechanized combat.  He characterized 
counterinsurgency as one small part of “full-spectrum warfare”201 and described in detail 
the successful use of armor in urban combat in Iraq.202  Tucker called Afghanistan a light 
infantry and airpower war while Iraq was a heavy, mechanized war, requiring the use of 
armor forces.  Tucker was primarily concerned, not with the future of the Iraq War, but 
with the armor branch’s future in Secretary Rumsfeld’s defense Transformation.203  
Armor 2005-2006: Army Bureaucratic Politics  
 General Tucker introduced the March/April 2005 Armor journal stating that, 
“Transformation is in full swing…” and then outlined ongoing conventional force 
structure changes,204 making no mention of irregular or counterinsurgency skills needed 
for the armor force in Iraq.  The Iraq War was characterized as a distraction from the 
important work of modernization under defense Transformation, and that the pace of this 
“reform” would be slowed by operational needs in Iraq.  Tucker still adhered to the 
assumption that the occupation of Iraq would be a brief affair requiring limited 
adjustments from the army’s core purpose of conventional combat.205 
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  An army doctrinal concept from Field Manual 3-0, Operations, used to describe war as composed of 
offense, defense, and stability and support operations. 
 
202
  Referring to tanks and Bradleys engaging in direct combat in the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the 2004 
battles in Najaf, Fallujah, and Sadr City. 
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  This issue of Armor featured no articles on low intensity conflict, counterinsurgency, or small wars; the 
focus was on the invasion of Iraq, general military history, and Transformation. Armor, (January/February 
2005), 4.  
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  The adoption of modular brigade combat team organization and new tanks for the 2nd Armored Cavalry 
Regiment. 
 
 94 
 Differing from General Tucker, was Captain Jason Pape’s “Winning with the 
People in Iraq.”206  Pape discussed the challenges a conventionally armed, equipped, and 
trained tank company faced as a “landowning” area security force in Northern Baghdad.  
Pape stated that, “We had not trained for this mission.  We prepared almost exclusively 
for combat operations.” a complaint that would be echoed by other junior officers in the 
pages of Armor.   He discussed the keys to success in this mission as: 1. finding effective 
local leaders, 2. building relationships with the community, and 3. separating the 
insurgents from the local population through careful targeting.207  Tucker focused on 
preparing the armor force for future war that looked very similar to wars of the past, 
while Pape described the pressing need to adopt skills for the current war that were a 
radical departure from standard armor training and skills.   
  First Lieutenant Barry A. Naum echoed Pape’s criticisms over the lack of relevant 
training for Iraq.  He argued that active and National Guard forces “have been called to 
accomplish missions well outside their military occupational specialties and training.”208  
The new Armor Center commander, Major General Williams, continued General 
Tucker’s conception of the transitory nature of the Iraq War and the enduring need to 
prepare for future war based on “Transformation.”  The Iraq War was rarely referenced 
by name, it was usually called, “today’s operational challenges” or the “contemporary 
                                                                                                                                                 
205
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 Armor, (January/February 2005), 35. 
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  Armor, (November/December  2005), 13.  
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operating environment,” and when referred to at all the wars were consistently described 
as distractions from force modernization.209   
 In his May/June 2005 column entitled, “Heavy Armor: The Core of Urban 
Combat” General Tucker argued that recent urban combat modifications made tanks, 
rather than light infantry, the premier urban combat tool.210 General Tucker extolled the 
virtue of the tank in urban combat while urban combat veteran Captain Raed Gyek 
questioned the assumptions of senior institutional leaders in “Back to the Future: A 
Company Commander’s Perspective on Transformation.”  Gyek argued that,                                                                                          
 War is much more than targeting objects211…For soldiers who have spent one day 
 fighting in the streets of Al Qa’im, Husaybah, or Fallujah, and the next day 
 delivering humanitarian aid or reconstruction aid along the same streets, this 
 simplistic assumption seems blatantly foolish.  These are not situations that lend 
 themselves to being easily categorized, patterned, analyzed, predicted, and 
 targeted.”212 
The contrast between Tucker, a general with more than 25 years of service, and Gyek, a 
captain with no more than ten, couldn’t be starker.  Tucker offered a simplistic, high-
technology vision of war where the application of firepower secured victory, while Gyek 
offered an eloquent repudiation of transformation with his description of the complexity, 
uncertainty, and ambiguity of modern war requiring the utmost flexibility and 
discrimination.  Here the traditional roles of a young, tactically-oriented officer with a 
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210
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 The use of sensors and digital communications to remove “the fog of war” and thus reveal enemy 
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Revolution in Military Affairs and Transformation thinking. 
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  Armor, (May/June 2005), 22.    
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narrow view of war and an experienced, strategic-minded general with a nuanced view of 
war were clearly reversed.   
 In the March/April 2006 issue Williams introduced a compendium of the “best” 
Iraq War entries to the journal.   Nowhere to be found was Captain Pape’s prescient 
description of population security and new training methodologies for counterinsurgency 
war.  However, traditional combat was well represented by articles on the initial ground 
invasion of Iraq, the 2004 Battle of Sadr City, and the Battle of Najaf.  Various other 
articles focused on narrow technical aspects of combat, such as techniques and force 
structure. These “Contemporary Lessons Learned” from the institution focused 
overwhelmingly on “kinetic” combat skills and ignored the more nuanced lessons of 
Pape, Gyek, and Naum.213  General Williams dedicated another issue of Armor a year 
later to the “great” articles of the past, from World War I to Operation Iraqi Freedom.  
This issue included two articles on Iraq: one on the initial invasion, one on the battles of 
2004, and again featuring none on counterinsurgency.  Williams argued that the Iraq War 
had “proved” the efficacy of heavy armor and justified extending the service life of the 
M1 main battle tank past 2050.214  
 In the May/June 2006 Armor journal, General Williams made the first substantive 
reference to counterinsurgency by an Armor Center commander since the beginning of 
the Iraq War.  He provided a rebuttal to former Australian Army officer and 
counterinsurgency expert, David Kilcullen’s criticism of the army’s overreliance on 
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armored vehicle patrols in his article “28 Articles of Counterinsurgency.”215  Williams 
argued that, “Without a doubt, his ideas have much merit, but armored vehicles still have 
an important role to play…Many of us who served in the Balkans during the 1990s recall 
the sudden calming effect the presence of an Abrams tank made on an unruly mob.”216  In 
the following month’s issue Williams continued, “In today’s operating environment, the 
tank remains the platform of choice…Its shock effect, intimidation, and firepower make 
it a key component in fighting the insurgency.”217  
 These two passages are rich with subtext and deserve to be unpacked.  First, it is 
difficult to relate how much a 1990s Kosovo “war story” from a general would infuriate 
most junior officers in 2006.  The lessons of Kosovo for the Iraq War had long expired by 
this point and a more obvious indication of “tone deafness” by an army senior leader is 
hard to imagine.  Furthermore, as many junior officers learned in Iraq and observed in 
Armor, the indiscriminate use of tanks and firepower in Iraq had the potential to escalate 
the level of violence rather than quelling it.  More violence required more tanks, creating 
a spiral of instability.  These contradictory lessons on the use of force were clearly not 
comprehended by the Armor Center leaders. The overriding concerns of Generals 
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Williams and Tucker seemed to be bureaucratic political advantage against the infantry 
branch, and the survival of specific weapons systems in the defense budget.   The gulf 
between the institutional leadership of the armor branch and many young officer veterans 
of Iraq couldn’t have been wider in 2006.  
Armor 2007: Lost “Core Competencies”  
 At what might be termed the moment of decision in the Iraq War, February 2007, 
Major General Williams opened the January/February 2007 with a question, “What can 
we do to stop the degradation of our core competencies?”  Williams established within 
the armor branch a conservative narrative that had been coalescing around an assumption 
that tactical “adaptations” in Iraq had blunted the sharp fighting edge of the conventional 
army.  Williams continued,  
 While I fully understand the requirements for training the Armor Branch to fight 
 the current enemy, we cannot forget that we must always be prepared to engage 
 and destroy the enemy in offensive and defensive operations…This 
 issue…highlight[s] lessons learned by the Israeli Defense Forces in its most 
 recent conflict with Hezbollah[the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War]”218 
  
 Also featured in this issue was an article coauthored by prominent 
counterinsurgency advocate, Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl.219  Significantly, the first 
issue of Armor featuring one of the armor community’s most famous counterinsurgency 
experts, and in the midst of the desperate conditions of the surge, centered on the lessons 
of the Israel-Hezbollah War.  This issue presented a contradictory message to the armor 
community.  At a critical juncture in the Iraq War, with the issue very much in doubt, the 
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Armor Center commander seemed to argue against the new Petraeus strategy in Iraq.  
The received wisdom of the Israel-Hezbollah War was that Israeli tankers paid a high 
price in a short, violent high-intensity fight for their recent focus on “COIN” in the 
Palestinian occupied territories: “the IDF’s experience demonstrates the need to retain 
core combat skills even as the United States takes on anti-terrorist missions in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.”  The Nagl article on training methods for the current Iraq War was placed 
after the Israel-Hezbollah War article and was not even mentioned by General Williams.  
The institutional message seemed clear: too much attention on counterinsurgency tactics 
could lead to catastrophic defeat in a “real” war as experienced by the Israelis.220 
 As the shift in tactics and strategy in Iraq finally began to reduce violence and 
reclaim insurgent dominated areas, several authors emphasized the need to accept the 
realities of the Iraq War: “Counterinsurgency may not be the fight we want, but it’s the 
fight we have.”221 and that, “Counterinsurgency is difficult.  As a force, we have only 
begun to rediscover and process the hard lessons of the past, which we largely discarded 
in our march to build the perfect maneuver and combat force.”222  As these officers 
discussed the difficult cultural adaptations required by the army for success in Iraq, 
General Williams asked in his column, “What will your next tank look like?”223  In the 
midst of the surge, one of the pivotal wartime events in recent U.S. military history, a 
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turning point on the level of the Tet Offensive in Vietnam, General Williams wanted to 
open up a debate over the design of the next main battle tank.  As the previous officers 
observed the army’s cultural aversion to counterinsurgency and its pressing need to 
adapt, both Generals Tucker and Williams consistently demonstrated vastly different 
priorities.  Both generals focused on concerns for bureaucratic politics, program 
budgeting, and adhered to a vision of high-intensity war that many junior officers did not 
share.   
 The institutional concerns of these generals were not in any way echoed by two of 
the armor branch’s premier Iraq War innovators: Colonels H.R. McMaster and Sean 
MacFarland.  Neither officer, nor many others featured in Armor, asked for a better tank 
or more machine guns.224  Junior officers like Pape, Gyek, Naum, and Nagl did ask for 
better training to prepare soldiers for Iraq.  Despite the oft heard refrain, “we were not 
trained for this mission,” preparation for the Iraq War was never systematically addressed 
by the Armor Center commanders in the pages of this journal.225  The institutional army 
lagged behind the needs of the operational army in Iraq and Armor issues from the 2005 
to 2007 illustrated this institutional disconnect.  The leaders of the armor branch clung to 
an intellectual framework based upon the post Vietnam narrative that had little relevance 
to junior officers for the war in Iraq.  The disconnect revealed a failure by many general 
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officers to conceive of future war, a failure to adapt to the current fight, and a failure to 
directly grapple with the uncomfortable realities of the Iraq War. 
A Field Artillery Officer’s Dissent 
 In May of 2007 the Armed Forces Journal published an article entitled, “A 
Failure in Generalship” by Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling.226  Yingling accused the 
entire army general officer corps, as a class, of being responsible for defeat in the Iraq 
War.  His charges were two-fold: first, the generals failed to prepare the army for war, 
and second, the generals failed to advise political leaders on the application of force to 
achieve policy aims.  Yingling drew a parallel between these failures and the failures of 
generals in the Vietnam War.227 He charged that, “The intellectual and moral failures 
common to America’s general officer corps in Vietnam and Iraq constitute a crisis in 
American generalship…”  Yingling identified the characteristics of “the generals we 
need” as intelligence, creativity, and moral, rather than physical, courage.228   
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Afar.  He was waiting to take command of a field artillery battalion at Fort Hood, Texas when this article 
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counterinsurgency warfare; and 6.  Failure to understand and accurately represent the Iraq War to the 
Congress and the public. Paul Yingling, “A Failure in Generalship,” Armed Forces Journal (May 2007)  
http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/05/2635198 (accessed April 24, 2012). 
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 Additionally, he advocated that Congress become more involved with general officer selection and 
promotion because the executive branch selects pliant “company men” and senior general officers promote 
conformist officers with similar career paths to their own.  He argued that Congress must hold generals 
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 Journalist Greg Jaffe described Yingling’s essay as part of a broader debate within 
the army that had developed along generational lines pitting young officers with Iraq 
experience, impatient for change, against older, more conservative generals.  With this 
article Yingling came to be a kind of “cult hero” to many frustrated junior officers.229  
Typical of the comments on the Small Wars Journal Council weblog was an observation 
that Lieutenant Colonel Yingling was, “only putting to paper what has been said in most 
every TOC [Tactical Operation Center] and chowhall in the last 4 years.”  Another 
officer added, 
 It is nearly four years since signs surfaced that we were being handicapped by 
 some of our generalship in Iraq.  If we had more of ability for tough, but 
 respectful discourse within the profession, where company and/or field grade 
 officers could offer criticisms of decisions made at the GO [General Officer] 
 level, then maybe we might not be at this point.230 
 The article quickly became a popular topic of discussion around the army, 
particularly in officer education programs.  In August of 2007 Vice Chief of Staff of the 
Army, General Richard Cody, visited the Armor Captains Career Course at Fort Knox, 
Kentucky.  One of the first questions from the audience of captains, many with Iraq War 
experience, asked for the general’s opinion of Yingling’s article.  General Cody 
                                                                                                                                                 
accountable for their performance, because “As matters stand now, a private who loses a rifle suffers far 
greater consequences than a general who loses a war.” 
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responded by turning the question around and asking the captains, “What’s your opinion 
of the general officer corps?”  Over the next 90 minutes five different captains stood up 
and voiced concerns drawn from Yingling’s essay to the general.  Journalist and author 
Fred Kaplan observed that, “Fort Knox reflected a brewing conflict between the Army’s 
junior and senior officer corps.”231   
 Lieutenant Colonel Yingling gave public voice to the confusion and frustration 
within the officer corps over the Iraq War.  This article was a powerful statement because 
of the passion it was written with and the extreme professional risk that Paul Yingling 
assumed by publishing it.  Among military officers, Yingling had significant moral 
authority and legitimacy as an Iraq War veteran who had participated in one of the war’s 
few successes in Tal ‘Afar.  Additionally, far from being a disgruntled officer who had 
been passed over for promotion, Yingling risked his pending battalion command and 
long-term career prospects by publishing this article.  Unlike the retired general officers 
of the 2006 “Revolt of the Generals,”232 Yingling voiced his dissent while still in uniform 
and not long after he had secured his pension and his final opportunity for promotion, as 
many junior officers had criticized the “Revolt of the Generals.”233   
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 Many conservative generals reacted defensively to Yingling’s argument.234   
Major General John Hammond, a conservative, conventional general led the reactionary 
charge against Yingling at Fort Hood, Texas.  He assembled a large group of junior 
officers from the 4th Infantry Division to hear his rebuttal of Yingling’s argument.  
Hammond asserted that generals were good men doing the best job possible.  He argued 
that Yingling was not a general officer and therefore unqualified to judge the 
performance of generals.  An unstated corollary to this statement was that no other junior 
officers were qualified to judge generals either.  The captain’s who attended this briefing 
were reportedly unimpressed with Hammond’s argument.235      
 A retired major general observed to Fred Kaplan that, “Guys like Yingling…are 
the canaries in the coal mine of Army reform.” his treatment by the service would be 
interpreted as a verdict by the general officer corps on his argument.236  In 2008 
Yingling’s battalion received orders that it would deploy to Iraq without its commander 
or staff.  As the retired general had predicted, this action was widely viewed as a reprisal 
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against Yingling for speaking out against the generals.  In Baghdad, General Petraeus 
learned of Yingling’s situation and personally intervened to have these orders rescinded 
and Yingling subsequently deployed with his men to Iraq.237   
 Yingling took issue with the senior institutional leaders of the army who had 
failed to commit sufficient effort to preparing for or adapting to, the Iraq War.  In a 2006 
interview at Fort Leavenworth, he observed the disconnect between the tactical army in 
Iraq and its institutional leadership in the U.S.:  “The institutional army…has not caught 
up in either professional education or organizational design with the challenges of 
counterinsurgency [in Iraq].238  Highlighting the importance of the stakes for which he 
was arguing, Yingling concluded that:  
 Iraq is America’s Valmy.239  American generals have been checked by a form of 
 war that they did not prepare for and that they do not understand.  They spent the 
 years following the 1991 Gulf War mastering a system of war without thinking 
 deeply about the ever changing nature of war.  They marched into Iraq having 
 assumed without much reflection that the wars of the future would look much the 
 wars of the past.240 
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E.  The Strategic Shift241 
General David Petraeus 
                               “We were going to do nation building and we weren’t going to hold it  
             at arm’s length.  We were an occupying army, and we 
                     had enormous responsibilities for the people.”242   
 General David Petraeus’ role as the strategic commander of the surge has been 
well-documented by journalists,243 but what has not been as well documented is the 
impact of Petraeus’ counterinsurgency doctrine on the U.S. Army as an institution.  
Petraeus’ provided decisive military and political leadership in the Iraq War in 2007, but 
a significant amount of the power of his leadership was established in 2006 with the 
unprecedented, in terms of its contents, production, and publicity, formulation of FM 3-
24, Counterinsurgency.  In conjunction with General Keane’s efforts at the highest 
political levels, and General  Odierno’s efforts at the tactical level, Petraeus initiated a 
significant change, in not only the war-time practices of the army, but also a challenge to 
its dominant philosophy.   
Petraeus and Doctrine: an “Engine of Change” 
 Petraeus accomplished this dramatic sea-change in the approach to the Iraq War 
not solely based on his intellect, strategic vision, or political skills, all of which were 
considerable, but through the creation of a new intellectual framework to conceptualize 
the war and guide action.  Innovation efforts in the Iraq War were disjointed and 
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directionless; while some units innovated effectively, others were engaged in non-
productive adaptation.  In military journals, on weblogs, in officer education programs, 
and in the field there was much discussion and debate about the proper course for the 
war, but it lacked a unifying intellectual framework to conceptualize the conflict.  Some 
leaders such as McMaster, embraced effective unconventional methods, and others such 
as Steele, retrenched into reactionary warfighting approaches. Regardless of approach, no 
technique achieved long term strategic success.  What was missing was not a prescriptive 
tactical primer for the war, but a comprehensive vision to guide action, that was flexible 
enough to take advantage of fleeting opportunities and reinforce local tactical successes.          
 General Petraeus was a conventional army officer that long operated against the 
cultural grain of his institution.  In the 1980s while completing his PhD dissertation at 
Princeton, he questioned the assumptions of the dominant Weinberger/Powell doctrine.  
He also studied U.S. counterinsurgency operations in Central America under his mentor 
General John Galvin when the institutional focus was on the defense of Cold War 
Europe.   He embraced the unpopular peacekeeping missions of the 1990s and even 
volunteered to serve in Haiti in 1994.  As the commander of the 101st Airborne Division 
in 2003, Petraeus achieved significant success in the immediate post-invasion 
stabilization of Mosul by explicitly embracing the nation building mission.244   Petraeus 
was also unusual among army officers in his sophisticated interactions with the media.245  
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Petraeus headed the Multinational Security Transition Command – Iraq (MNSTC-I) 
under General Casey and frequently clashed with his superior.246  In what was widely 
interpreted as punishment by the army senior leadership for his high media profile and 
mixed performance as MNSTC-I commander, General Petraeus was assigned to the Fort 
Leavenworth Combined Arms Center.  This command was responsible for elements of 
training, doctrine, and officer education and its previous commander had been sent there 
after running afoul of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.247   
 Cloud and Jaffe described Petraeus as, “plotting an insurgency of his own, one 
aimed at changing his service” through the doctrine generating power of his command.248  
General Petraeus viewed the Combined Arms Center as an “engine of change” to make 
the army more adaptable in facing irregular warfare challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
In an attempt to address the disconnect between the institutional army and the army 
deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, Petraeus embarked on a multipronged assault to 
improve the service’s adaptability.  He began by expanding and streamlining the Center 
for Army Lessons Learned, which collected, analyzed, and redistributed to tactical units 
the best practices and newest tactics being used throughout the two combat zones.  He 
also ordered the Combat Training Centers to modify their Cold War-based training 
scenarios to reflect current operations in the Middle East and Central Asia.  He changed 
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the curricula for officer education to reflect the need for adaptable leaders in irregular 
environments.  Finally, he focused on developing and publishing a revolutionary, in army 
terms, doctrinal manual by conducting the first thorough revision of U.S. 
counterinsurgency doctrine in 25 years.249   
The “Necessary Anomaly” of FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency   
 General Petraeus established, along with U.S. Marine General James Mattis, a 
joint, multidisciplinary writing team headed by retired army officer and history professor 
Conrad Crane.  The previous cursory attempt to revise the counterinsurgency manual in 
2004 was labored on by a single army officer; the new team was a dynamic mix of army 
and marine officers with Iraq experience like Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl, and 
academics such as Johns Hopkins professor Eliot Cohen and Harvard’s Carr Center for 
Human Rights director, Sarah Sewell.250  General Petraeus was deeply involved in the 
conceptualization, drafting, and editing of the manual251 in an unprecedented open and 
collaborative doctrine writing process.252 Petraeus intended for his new manual to be a 
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framing argument for the efficacy of counterinsurgency operations and for this doctrinal 
publication to have the same organizational, material, and philosophical impact as Active 
Defense and AirLand Battle doctrines of the Cold War had on defining the army 
philosophy of war.253  
 Since the U.S. was limited in the “acceptable” types of counterinsurgency 
campaign it could wage by international law, norms on human rights, and global media, a 
population-centric approach was selected over an enemy-centric, or any other approach 
that caused intentional, mass civilian suffering.254  The manual featured a distinct break 
from past doctrinal focus on high-intensity war, technology, and firepower.255  The 
counterinsurgency manual asserted that, “counterinsurgency operations have been 
neglected in broader American military doctrine…since the end of the Vietnam 
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War…This manual is designed to reverse that trend.”256 It continued that, “Throughout its 
history, the U.S. military has had to relearn the principles of counterinsurgency (COIN) 
while conducting operations against adaptive insurgent enemies.  It is time to 
institutionalize Army and Marine Corps knowledge of this longstanding form of 
conflict.”257  This manual squarely took aim at systemic failures to plan for 
counterinsurgency war and the failure of the institutional army to internalize the lessons 
of past counterinsurgent wars.   More fundamentally, it was taking issue with the army’s 
dominant interpretation of history over the last 30 years and explicitly criticizing the 
army’s singular focus on high-intensity war to the exclusion of all other types of war.    
A Driver of Structural Change 
 Petraeus’ doctrine achieved its greatest impact as a force of structural change 
within the army institution.  By harnessing the power of formal doctrine to influence 
informal doctrine and common practice, Petraeus leveraged a shift in not only tactics and 
strategy, but in philosophy.  Petraeus addressed both the narrow issue of failure in the 
Iraq War and the broader issue of the rigid post-Vietnam doctrine system.  The 
publication of the unconventional counterinsurgency doctrine “forced” the institutional 
army to deal with the war and reconsider long held and unexamined assumptions about 
warfare in general. The multiple references to the forgotten lessons of Vietnam and the 
overall tone of the manual, especially the section on “Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency 
Operations,” was a systematic refutation of the lessons of the post Vietnam era.  These 
observations were a cause of great consternation among the critics of counterinsurgency 
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doctrine,258 and among some conventionally-minded senior officers who were 
uncomfortable with the high level of uncertainty, risk, and decentralization that this 
doctrine advocated.  This manual was a sharp break from nearly 20 years of formal 
doctrine and common practice that sought to reduce uncertainty with technology, reduce 
risk with firepower, and centralize command with digitization, and narrow the conception 
of the legitimate uses of force.       
 As a functional driver of change within the army, Petraeus’ doctrine had unique 
power within the structure of both the institutional and deployed army.  In late 2006, the 
Iraq War seemed intractable and as previously discussed some units did not successfully 
adapt.  This framework provided a conceivable path to success in the Iraq War.  With an 
officially approved counterinsurgency manual in existence, the training and equipping 
functions of the institutional army could no longer simply ignore the war and continue to 
focus on “Transformation,” or any other agenda.  Formal doctrine served as a final arbiter 
of priorities; if there was a question of pre-deployment training priorities for Iraq or 
Afghanistan, this manual settled the debate.  Before Petraeus modified the training 
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scenarios for the major training centers to more accurately reflect the warzones, many 
units simply fell back on tasks and formal doctrine that they knew best: high-intensity 
combat.  With the release of FM 3-24, there now existed an intellectual framework within 
which lower level commanders could innovate and adapt even if the doctrine did not 
prescribe specific tactics for counterinsurgency.  In contrast to the prescriptive doctrine 
system of the post Vietnam era, the counterinsurgency manual was intentionally written 
to enable a high level of discretion in its execution.259   
 General Petraeus commanded U.S. forces in the most decisive period of the Iraq 
War.  In part he succeeded through publishing the first significant revision of U.S. 
military doctrine on counterinsurgency in 25 years and positioning himself as the most 
prominent military counterinsurgency expert in the U.S.  By establishing a formal 
doctrine to support his plan for strategic and tactical change in the Iraq War, General 
Petraeus strengthened his argument against the philosophy of the army establishment by 
providing a theoretical framework to make the war a problem that could be solved.  
Petraeus’ “primed” many officers to think more critically about the war through his 
doctrine.  In contrast, General Casey was supported by decades of formal and informal 
doctrine and common practice, but never addressed the confusion generated among 
officers over his strategy.  This manual provided officers a “safe” way to innovate in the 
Iraq War.260  This doctrine provided officers with a powerful argument, since formal 
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doctrine is sacrosanct, to challenge more conservative or risk-averse commanders.   
Petraeus’ “radical” doctrine took aim at many of the army’s ingrained post Vietnam era 
beliefs about war and the use of force, and offered a solution that addressed the 
dissonance experienced by officers through the misalignment of strategy and tactics.  
General Jack Keane 
    “In the fall of 2006 Jack Keane effectively became the  
     chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”261 
 On September 19, 2006 army General Jack Keane, an influential retired officer, 
visited Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld at the Pentagon and bluntly informed the 
Secretary that, “We’re edging towards strategic failure” in Iraq.  He succinctly outlined to 
Rumsfeld and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Marine General Peter Pace, the 
history of failure in Iraq.  He stated that the U.S. had lacked a plan for post-war 
stabilization or grand strategy in 2003 and 2004, and he described the 2004 and 2005 plan 
as a “short war strategy” for a long war.  The transition of security responsibilities to the 
Iraqi Security Forces and the U.S. command’s singular focus on force protection was 
fueling the violence in Iraq.  Keane argued that the strategy no longer matched the reality 
of the situation in Iraq and was making things worse for U.S. forces and the Iraqi people.   
Keane as War Planner 
 General Keane advocated the immediate adoption of a classic counterinsurgency 
strategy with population protection as the way to defeat the insurgency, with McMaster’s 
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Tal ‘Afar campaign as the model.  He criticized Rumsfeld for not holding generals 
accountable for their failures in the Iraq War.  Defeating insurgents required 
decentralization and General Casey had centralized everything in the Iraq War: 
command, resources, and personnel, all to keep casualties low.  According to journalist 
Bob Woodward, Rumsfeld was receptive to Keane’s criticism, taking copious notes, and 
asked Keane to attend a follow up meeting with General Pace.262  
 Three days later General Keane met privately with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
Peter Pace and offered more blunt criticism.   When Pace asked Keane to evaluate his 
performance as chairman, Keane immediately responded with, “I would give you a 
failing grade.”  Pace was reportedly taken aback by such an impolitic response and asked 
Keane to elaborate.  Keane told Pace that he wasn’t proactive; he wasn’t focused or 
helping in the conduct of the two active wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the first on life-
support and the second rapidly failing.  He suggested an immediate secret strategy review 
at the Pentagon, later called the “Council of Colonels,” to help determine strategy options 
to reverse the downward spiral of the war.  He suggested that Colonel H.R. McMaster 
lead this council and that General David Petraeus take command of the Iraq War from 
Casey.  Pace agreed to the review and cancelled a trip abroad to begin the Pentagon’s 
first in-depth review of the Iraq War since 2002.263  
 What was significant about Keane’s criticism was that it came from a respected 
general who had maintained his credibility and influence, both in and out of the military, 
despite the reversals of the last few years.  Keane was liked by Rumsfeld and turned 
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down a promotion from him in 2003.  Keane was also unique in that he was still 
committed to a U.S. victory in Iraq and not averse to shortcutting military and political 
bureaucracy to achieve his goals.  Keane used his influence with the Secretary of Defense 
to begin a top-down review of Iraq strategy, but he was not content to wait for a thorough 
bureaucratic review process to run its course.   
 Through his extensive military connections,264 Keane began to assemble a 
coalition of like-minded officers and policy advisors to argue for a shift in Iraq War 
strategy.  In December he met with military historian and policy analyst, Frederick 
Kagan, at the American Enterprise Institute and evaluated their plan for an increase in 
troop strength to turn around the war.  He reviewed their detailed analysis of available 
U.S. forces for a surge in Iraq and was satisfied that there was a viable plan at AEI to 
support his argument for a counterinsurgency strategy.  Acting in his assumed role of 
shadow Chairman of the JCS, Keane had established his own “joint staff” at the AEI 
think-tank to conduct strategic and manpower staff analysis.265   
 Having offered his blunt strategic guidance to the Pentagon and setting the 
ponderous wheels of defense bureaucracy in motion and establishing his own nimble staff 
at AEI, Keane struck at the highest level of political decision-making at a December 11, 
2006 meeting with President Bush over the Iraq War.  This meeting was attended by 
several retired military officers, national security experts, and academics.  While many of 
the attendees were pessimistic that any troop increases could salvage the war, Keane was 
characteristically blunt to the President, “We’re in a crisis and time is running out” and 
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“We don’t have a plan to defeat the insurgency.”  However, unlike many of the other 
attendees, Keane, backed up by the detailed AEI plan, offered a plausible plan for 
strategic victory in Iraq.  Keane argued that the U.S. needed not just a surge in troop 
numbers, but a complete change in tactics and strategy.   Besides impressing the 
President, Keane also impressed Vice President Cheney’s national security advisor John 
Hannah, who arranged a private in-depth briefing to the Vice President of Keane’s 
plan.266  
Keane as War Leader 
 In 2006 Keane was in frequent contact with his former subordinate General 
Odierno to ensurer that his surge plan was a workable strategy for the Iraq War.  He was 
also heavily involved in making sure that generals like Casey, Schoomaker, and Pace did 
not undermine the new war plan.  Odierno relayed to Keane that he thought the AEI plan 
was workable, but stated that “My problem’s Casey,” Odierno’s immediate commander 
in Iraq.   Keane found out through his contacts in the Pentagon’s operations staff (J3) that 
Casey, with Chairman Pace’s concurrence, was planning a compromise surge plan called 
“2 plus 2.”267  Keane viewed this sequential option as an attempt by Casey to undermine 
the entire surge plan with which Casey fundamentally disagreed.  Keane voiced his 
concerns with both the National Security Advisor and the Vice President, that Casey and 
Pace’s plan did not meet the President’s intent for a decisive action to turn the war 
around.  Briefed by the Vice President on Keane’s criticisms, the President overruled 
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Pace’s “2 plus 2” recommendations in favor of the five army brigade and 2 marine 
battalion plan.268   
 Once Keane helped establish a permissive political environment for the changes 
that Petraeus and Odierno were about to carry out, he continued to act in the manner of a 
George Marshall war leader by traveling to Iraq frequently throughout 2007 and 2008 to 
ensure that the military effort for success in Iraq was unified at the strategic and tactical 
level.  In March of 2007 Keane established a back-channel line of communication, 
unfiltered by the Central Command or Defense bureaucracy, between the President and 
Petraeus through the Vice President.269  This led to an unprecedented statement of 
support for Petraeus delivered to Keane personally by the President in September 2007.  
The President relayed that, “I waited over three years for a successful strategy.  And I’m 
not going to give up on it prematurely.  I am not reducing [troop levels] further unless 
you are convinced we should reduce further.”270     
 From late 2006 until 2008 Keane enabled a major change in the army as an 
organization and a dramatic reversal of fortune in the Iraq War.  Keane had the moral 
authority, both within the military and with the Bush Administration, to challenge 
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and the institutional army’s resistance to investing in the 
war.  Despite the many setbacks of the Iraq War, Rumsfeld, Casey, Abizaid, and the 
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service chiefs were all still committed to the Transition strategy well into late 2006.  
Keane challenged this orthodoxy within the defense establishment and provided the 
President the opportunity to overrule his military advisors based upon a legitimate, 
alternative military plan.   
 In contrast to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who seemed remote from the conduct of 
two active wars in anything other than in a “force generation” role, General Keene acted 
as the senior military advisor to the President as General Maxwell Taylor and General 
George C. Marshall had in earlier generations.  By providing senior political leaders with 
a viable “theory of victory” Keane set the groundwork for a permissible political 
environment to achieve a shift in strategy and a significant change in army operations.  
Keane addressed a clear dysfunction in the national approach to the Iraq War and was 
able to conduct strategic planning, provide expert military advice, select combatant 
commanders, and unify political and military strategy at the national level, all as a private 
citizen.  
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General Raymond Odierno271 
“Odierno is extremely good at using the force to execute what Petraeus wants to do.              
It’s a beautiful thing to watch” 272 
Rejecting the Transition Strategy 
 In December of 2006, Lieutenant General Odierno took command of 
Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) and received “The Bridging Strategy”273 briefing from 
his commander, General Casey.  In light of the failures of the 2006 attempts to rein in 
violence in Baghdad in Operation Together Forward I and II, these orders were a tacit 
admission of the failure of the U.S. mission in Iraq.  “The Bridging Strategy” was 
effectively a U.S. withdrawal to the periphery of Iraq while Iraqi Security Forces fought 
the insurgency in the cities and villages.274  General Odierno immediately began to 
reconsider this plan.  He concluded that the U.S. needed to move back into the cities and 
establish Combat Outposts, that the transition to ISF control of security must be slowed, 
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and that more U.S. troops were needed.  At Keane’s urging, Odierno began to advocate 
for a large surge of U.S. forces in Iraq, but General Casey disagreed with Odierno.275   
 General Odierno was the only military officer in the entire chain of command 
arguing for a surge and a new approach in Iraq.  In the presence of Generals Casey and 
Abizaid, during a visit to Baghdad by Secretary of Defense Gates, General Odierno 
emphatically disagreed with his superiors’ assessment of the viability of a surge.  Both 
General Casey at MNF-I, and General Abizaid at CENTCOM, backed by the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, were opposed to any escalation.  In the midst of this power struggle in Baghdad 
and Washington, General Odierno ordered his staff to begin detailed planning to employ 
five surge brigades in Iraq despite how unlikely it seemed that these troops would ever 
arrive.   
 Odierno developed a nuanced understanding of the varying elements of the Iraq 
War and rejected the simplistic understanding of the insurgency as implied by the 
widespread use of terms like “Anti-Iraqi Forces”276 to describe the insurgency.  His 
command defined the problem of Iraq as, “a struggle between different communities for 
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 This was all of the manpower Casey needed for his plan to “stiffen” ISF units in the cities with more 
American embedded advisors at joint outposts with the Iraqis.  It is important to note that these nascent 
Joint Security Stations were outposts designed to facilitate the transition of U.S. forces to the borders on too 
even bigger FOBs and not intended as commitments to population security as they were later in 2007 and 
2008.   
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 Terms like “Anti-Iraqi Forces” and “Anti-Coalition Forces” were used to define the insurgency from 
2004 until 2007.  These terms became a metaphor for the lack of deep U.S. understanding of the multiple 
insurgencies and their disparate motivations.  The term was explicitly abandoned by General Odierno in 
2007 because it confused more than it clarified.  The use of the term AIF implied that: 1. there was a 
unitary insurgency, or that more accurately the U.S. simply did not understand the elements of the 
insurgency 2. that insurgents were somehow against Iraq, even though many were motivated by their own 
understanding of Iraqi nationalism, 3. denied the existence of sectarian conflict and 4. the U.S. was the 
judge of who was and was not a “good” Iraqi.  Ricks, The Gamble,353; and United Kingdom, House of 
Commons. Iraq Inquiry Commission. Testimony of Emma Sky, 14 January 2011. 
http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/52057/Sky-2011-01-14-S1-declassified.pdf (accessed October 24 
2011), 41-42.    
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power and resources…not simply an insurgency…”  The Iraqi government and security 
forces were identified as partisans in this conflict and not as neutral actors.277  The 
conclusions reached by General Odierno in late 2006  were nothing less than the reversal 
of the entire Casey Transition strategy and all of the assumptions that it was built upon; 
specifically, that the U.S. was driving the insurgency and that the Iraqi Security Forces 
were the only ones who could stop the violence.  The gulf was immense between General 
Casey’s orders to Odierno in late 2006 and the plan that General Odierno gave to 
incoming commander General Petraeus in February 2007.  General Odierno’s  “Security 
Now” briefing to Petraeus outlined a campaign plan for arresting sectarian violence and 
restoring the security situation throughout Iraq. 278   
Conventional Campaign Planning 
 Operationalizing the new counterinsurgency doctrine for the conditions in Iraq 
was Odierno’s most significant contribution to the efforts of the Keane and Petraeus to 
change the army approach in Iraq.  Odierno adapted conventional combat methods to the 
needs of the comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy established by General Petraeus.  
He filled the technical gaps in the Counterinsurgency manual and made military power 
support strategic political goals.  Critics charged that counterinsurgency doctrine 
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 Specific “drivers of instability” in Iraq were identified as: AQI/Sunni insurgents, Shia extremists, 
Kurdish expansionism, Shia on Shia violence, external (Iranian) subversion, criminals, and the weak central 
government. Sky, “Iraq 2007- Moving Beyond Counter-Insurgency Doctrine,” 30. Odierno, “The Surge 
One Year Later,” 3.; and Ricks, The Gamble, 119 
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  Key tasks from Security Now briefing: 1. Secure the population where they lived with priority on 
Baghdad; 2.“Interdict accelerants of Baghdad sectarian violence”; 3.  Neutralize AQI car bomb network; 4. 
Balance targeting against both Sunni and Shia extremists; 5.  Control national borders and counter Iranian 
influence; 6.  Improve capability of Iraqi Security Forces; 7.  Transition to Iraqi self-reliance; 8.  Focus on 
economic development.  Ricks, The Gamble, 345-349, 351-376.      
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attempted to remove combat from the essence of war;279 however, General Odierno’s 
surge campaign was remarkably conventional, from a military standpoint, and relied on 
significant combat for success.280  Despite the fact that generals Sanchez and Casey were 
both conventional warfighters in outlook and training, Petraeus and Odierno were the 
first commanders to initiate a corps-level offensive in history of the Iraq War.281 
 This offensive was built on a fundamental understanding of the security situation 
and the strategies of the two most prominent insurgent groups, the Sunni Al Qaeda in 
Iraq282 and the Shia Jaysh al-Mahdi.283  The first phase of Odierno’s offensive was the 
                                                 
279
 See various articles by Colonel Gian Gentile. 
 
280
 For the significant use of firepower in combat by the 3ID to secure the “Belts” south of Baghdad see 
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  The offensives undertaken in 2004-2006 had been local affairs that withdrew combat forces from one 
area to focus on another; a practice that many officers characterized as a game of “whack-a-mole.”  One of 
Odierno’s first suggestions to General Petraeus was that he balance securing Baghdad itself and the “Belts” 
that surrounded it.  Petraeus agreed and Odierno eventually deployed roughly equal numbers of Surge units 
to the city and the belts, even creating a new division level command, Multinational Division Central to 
handle the belts south of Baghdad. Ricks, The Gamble, 165.; and Andrade.  
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 Targeting AQI: As the smaller and more aggressive combatants, AQI received the bulk of the overt 
attention from the U.S. campaign.  It was viewed as an irreconcilable element of the insurgency that sought 
and created instability and violence for its own sake.  AQI had initiated and sustained the sectarian civil 
war as a method to force Iraqi Sunnis to support it and undermine the Shia-dominated government and the 
U.S. occupation.  Operation Phantom Thunder pushed significant U.S. and Iraqi military forces into the 
belts around Baghdad to clear AQI fighters and reestablish permanent U.S. and Iraqi government control of 
these mostly Sunni communities. Catherine Dale, “Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategies, Approaches, 
Results, and Issues for Congress,” (Washington, D.C., Congressional Research Service: 2008), 85.; and  
Kagan, 17.   
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 Targeting JAM: The U.S. campaign also targeted Jaysh al-Mahdi, albeit in a more indirect manner.  
Previous military assaults on Muqtada al-Sadr’s Jaysh al-Mahdi in Najaf, Karbala, and Sadr City resulted in 
stalemates that had simultaneously raised Sadr’s profile as a freedom fighter and mobilized many 
sympathetic Shia to his cause.  Under the Baghdad Security Plan U.S. security efforts in local areas and 
barriers and checkpoints helped fracture and isolate the different Jaysh al-Mahdi elements in the city.  U.S. 
forces also began targeting what was described as “Special Groups” or “criminal” JAM leadership, or the 
most violent of the movement.  Odierno did not directly challenge Sadr or reenter Sadr City, preferring 
instead to pursue a political reconciliation approach, but maintained pressure on his movement’s leadership, 
fracturing its unity, and cutting its supplies from Iran under both the Baghdad Security Plan and Operation 
Phantom Thunder.  Dale, 84.; Kagan,16; and Cockburn, 187-198. 
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Baghdad Security Plan, or Fardh al-Qanoon.284 Under this plan an Iraqi Baghdad 
Operations Center was established under Lieutenant General Abud Qanbar to command 
all Iraqi Army, National Police, and Iraqi Police in the city.  It also included a renewed 
partnering and mentoring effort between U.S. surge forces and the Iraqi Security Forces.  
Rather than only relying on embedded training teams, U.S. tactical units at all levels 
directly “partnered” with an Iraqi counterpart in their areas of operation.  Additional U.S. 
surge forces and Iraqi forces were committed to securing Baghdad neighborhoods in 
newly established small outposts and Joint Security Stations.  Population control 
measures, like barriers between neighborhoods and fixed Iraqi checkpoints, helped 
decrease sectarian violence and freeze ethnic cleansing.  U.S. special operations forces 
and conventional forces, with Iraqi government acquiescence, began targeting Shia 
extremists as aggressively as they did Sunni extremists.285   
 The second phase of the offensive began with Operation Phantom Thunder 
initiated in June of 2007 to retake the Baghdad Belts and prevent “accelerants”286 from 
entering Baghdad.  This phase of the campaign was based on a clear understanding of the 
strategies of both AQI and Jaysh al-Mahdi and how U.S. forces could best defeat them.  
Securing Baghdad and the Belts was followed by another unprecedented first in the Iraq 
War, a sustained pursuit of insurgents displaced by a successful security operation.  
Operations Phantom Strike and Phantom Phoenix focused on pursuing retreating Al 
Qaeda fighters through the Diyala River Valley, into Ninewah province, and finally to 
                                                 
284
  Enforcing/Imposing the Law in Arabic.   
 
285
 Sky, “Iraq 2007 – Moving Beyond Counter-Insurgency Doctrine,” 30-31.; and Kagan, 115-117. 
 
286
  Explosives, weapons, and fighters. 
 125 
Mosul throughout 2007 and 2008.287  This constant pressure on the worst of the Sunni 
insurgency, allowed Odierno to consolidate many of his conventional campaign gains by 
enabling local level political accommodations and the extension of the Sons of Iraq 
program throughout Iraq.  Unlike previous clearance operations, significant U.S. forces 
remained with Iraqi Security Forces to hold and secure population centers.288  
 By providing a workable, tactical interpretation of the Petraues counterinsurgency 
doctrine, Odierno was able to “prove” its efficacy in the domain that mattered most in the 
army: combat.   Just as the October War of 1973 and the 1991 Gulf War validated U.S. 
high-intensity war doctrine; Odierno’s surge campaign validated the counterinsurgency 
theories of General Petraeus.  It was even more convincing to many officers that General 
Odierno, a conventional officer with a reputation as a hard-nosed division commander in 
2004, was able to operationalize a “conventional” counterinsurgency campaign.  An 
unconventional counterinsurgency campaign was made recognizable to many officers by 
its use of conventional war terminology, such as offense, defeat, and pursuit.  Odierno 
drew on conventional military methods and integrated them into an operational strategy 
that emphasized unconventional counterinsurgency methods that were all aligned with 
Petraues’ new intellectual framework for the Iraq War. 
F.  Convergence 
 Simple lower level unit innovation does not adequately explain why the army 
changed during the Iraq War.  Nor do the arguments that changes were imposed from 
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senior levels of the organization or dictated by the strategic environment offer a 
comprehensive explanation of this change.  As we have seen in the varying tactical 
experiences in the war, adaptation was not uniformly experienced or evenly distributed 
throughout Iraq.289  Additionally, the strategic shift of Petraeus, Keane, and Odierno was 
fairly radical compared to the established culture and doctrine of the army, and would 
have been difficult to impose on an unwilling officer corps.  Critical to offering a 
comprehensive explanation of this change dynamic is an understanding of the 
convergence of widespread critiques of the existing operational strategy from the rank-
and-file and the articulation of an alternative strategy from a coalition of senior leaders. 
 The Casey Transition strategy, based on the establishment post Vietnam narrative, 
failed to cope with the situation in Iraq.  This failure, combined with the dissonance 
experienced among young officer veterans of the Iraq War, and the appearance of the 
coalition of Petraeus, Keane, and Odierno armed with a plausible alternative strategy, 
overturned the Casey strategy and fractured the post-Vietnam consensus within the army.  
If a critical mass of rank-and-file officers had not been primed for change, first, by the 
failure of Casey to address the contradictions in his strategy, and second, by the 
appearance of discourse on alternatives, then it would have been unlikely that Petraeus 
and associates could have simply imposed their concepts on the army.290   
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 The example of Colonel Steele demonstrates how a unit could regress from successful innovation in 
2003 to counterproductive behaviors in 2006 and not simply “accumulate” learning in a virtuous cycle of 
innovation.  If one man, Steele, could derail an entire brigade’s worth of learning and experience, then 
organizational learning is not a complete explanation of change.  The clear geographical divide between 
successful innovation on the periphery of the war, McMaster in the remote Tal Afar and MacFarland in the 
“lost” city of Ramadi, and the non-progressive adaptation that occurred in Baghdad, demonstrates that there 
was uneven distribution of the opportunities for innovation.  There seems to be a correlation between 
distance from MNF-I headquarters in Baghdad and the opportunity/flexibility to innovate.    
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 Conversely, if the coalition of reformers had not articulated a comprehensive 
alternative to the establishment narrative, it is equally unlikely that that a virtuous cycle 
of tactical innovation would have resulted in a strategic shift in the U.S. approach to the 
war.  Despite the attractiveness of a narrative of grassroots innovation overcoming 
organizational dogma, this was simply not the case in the Iraq War.  Casey rejected the 
tactical model provided by McMaster in Tal ‘Afar and resisted the local level 
accommodations achieved by MacFarland in Ramadi until his last day in command in 
2007.  While Casey did not revert to Vietnam-style prescribed tactics as General 
Westmoreland had, Casey used the more indirect, but effective, method of controlling the 
tactics of the Iraq War by appealing to the traditional army dislike of ambiguous small 
wars and by utilizing structural controls available to him as the senior commander.291  
 The coalition of Petraeus, Keane, and Odierno did not simply impose a new 
strategy on the army in Iraq from on high. They offered a new intellectual framework for 
the entire war.  This new framework, while running counter to much of recent army 
intellectual tradition, directly addressed the dissonance experienced by rank-and-file 
officers.  In contrast to the Casey strategy, this framework enabled tactical discretion and 
opportunistically adopted innovations developed at lower levels.  Petraeus established the 
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 Innovations such as McMaster and MacFarland’s campaigns, among others, offered tactical alternatives 
that were not examined or replicated in a comprehensive manner by Casey.  By ignoring these alternatives 
that were narrowly successful tactically and not even attempting to turn them into strategic successes, 
Casey appeared disconnected from reality and rigid to many officers.   
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  These controls consisted of the FOB consolidation directive that prioritized force protection over 
security and made it functionally difficult for units to engage in population security.  Secondly, he took 
advantage of army unit and leader rotations to diminish the impact of troublesome innovations like 
McMaster’s Tal Afar campaign.  Finally, Casey controlled the metrics of success used to validate his 
Transition strategy and thus controlled what counted as progress.  Casey measured success in sectors 
transferred to the Iraqi Security Forces regardless of their capabilities or the state of the objective security 
situation.  This allowed him to report progress both to Washington and to his command and to continually 
drawdown and forecast withdrawal from Iraq well into late 2006.               
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framing argument for this new strategic conception through the power of formal doctrine 
in FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency.  Keane challenged the entrenched civilian and military 
orthodoxy in Washington and enabled the adoption of a new national strategic direction 
in the war.  Finally, Odierno used conventional methods in an unconventional operational 
strategy that successfully turned the Petraeus doctrine into reality.  This framework was 
based on a new conception of the war predicated on redefined military victory and not 
simply on getting out of Iraq.    
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CHAPTER V 
THE AMBIGUITY OF CHANGE 
                     “Fool!” cried the hunchback. “You fell victim to one of the classic blunders.                                                
                                The most famous is ‘Never get involved in a land war in Asia,’   
                                              but only slightly less well known is this:  Never go in  
                           against a Sicilian when death is on the line.”292                           
A. Developments Subsequent to the Surge 
 Will the changes of 2007 translate into the overthrow of the dominant post 
Vietnam narrative in the army?  Events subsequent to the surge in the Iraq War have 
presented a complex and ambiguous picture of organizational change.  The end of the 
U.S. presence in Iraq, the ongoing developments in the war in Afghanistan, the global 
financial crisis of 2008, and the shift in Obama Administration national security priorities 
have all convoluted lessons from the Iraq War that may have appeared as self-evident in 
2008.293  The U.S. Army has moved into an era of debate over the lessons of Iraq that 
mirrors many of the conditions of the immediate post Vietnam era.   
 At the end of the Vietnam War, President Nixon shifted U.S. foreign policy focus 
from the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations’ focus on countering communist 
insurgencies in the developing world back to countering the Soviet Union in Europe.  
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 RTK [pseud.], comment on “What are the top 5 things we’ve learned from OIF,” The Small Wars 
Journal Council forum, comment posted November 18, 2007, 
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=4327 (accessed April 30, 2012).  RTK quoting an 
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 The general dynamic of organizational change as outlined in previous chapters in both the post Vietnam 
and Iraq War eras still has merit.  Even in an uncertain security environment, a permissive external political 
context, an intellectual framework to guide action, and operational examples to validate that framework are 
all still necessary for the establishment of a dominant organizational narrative. 
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Similarly, President Obama has shifted U.S. national security focus from the Bush 
Administration’s interventions in the Middle East to countering the influence of a rising 
China in the Asia-Pacific region.294  Just as the Nixon Administration rejected the use of 
large-scale U.S. interventions in the developing world, so too has President Obama 
rejected the scale, cost, and purpose of the U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
 Mirroring the role of Colonel Harry Summers in challenging the 
counterinsurgency lessons of Vietnam, Colonel Gian Gentile has emerged as the most 
prominent army traditionalist rejecting the counterinsurgency lessons of Iraq.295  While 
he has not authored a single volume as influential as Summers’ On Strategy, Gentile has 
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 In January of 2012, President Obama released a new defense strategy designed to rebalance the 
capabilities of the U.S. military and refocus strategic priorities on the Asia-Pacific region.  Within this 
document, Secretary of Defense Panetta argues that in an era of economic austerity and emergent threats 
that the U.S. military needed to be, “smaller and leaner,” an, “agile, flexible, ready, and technologically 
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been a prolific critic, in print and in military weblogs, of the received wisdom of General 
Petraeus’ counterinsurgency theory.  Gentile has led a conservative resurgence in defense 
of the assumptions of the post Vietnam narrative from its low ebb of 2007.  Again 
echoing the immediate post Vietnam era, this argument has found renewed vigor based 
on the simple exhaustion of the rank-and-file officer corps from the long engagements in 
Iraq and Afghanistan and the apparent ambiguous outcomes of both wars.296 
 However, there are significant differences between the post Vietnam and post Iraq 
eras that indicate that history may not simply repeat itself.  Unlike the 1976 repudiation 
of small wars in General DePuy’s capstone formal doctrine, many of the tenets of 
General Petraeus’ counterinsurgency theory have been institutionalized within the army’s 
most important doctrinal publication, Field Manual 3-0, Operations.  In the 2008 edition, 
the first post September 11, 2001 update of capstone army doctrine, stability operations 
were given direct parity with traditional combat operations.297  This development was 
clearly influenced by the 2006 publication of FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency.  To have 
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 The guiding principle of army “full-spectrum operations” is a rubric called “offense-defense-stability” 
(ODS).  However, in the 2001 edition of FM 3-0, the traditional combat operations of offense and defense 
were clearly prioritized over the more nebulous, stability operations. Kem, 49. 
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irregular stability operations elevated to actual equality with traditional combat 
operations is a first in the history of formal doctrine in the army and indicates the 
institutionalization of at least part of Petraeus’ doctrine within the structure of the 
army.298   
 Secondly, unlike the immediate post Vietnam era, conservative generals have not 
dominated the senior positions of the institutional army in the wake of the surge.299  With 
the passing of General Petraeus from the military scene, it has fallen to General Odierno, 
as the final active member of the surge coalition of senior officers, to institutionalize the 
developments of the army over the last ten years of war.300  As Chief of Staff of the 
Army, he has adopted a hybrid approach to mediate the demands of national strategy and 
the lessons of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  He has defined the post Iraq and 
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than a year before being elevated to the Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff). 
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Afghanistan mission of the army as “Prevent, Shape, Win.”  Prevention is a return to 
conventional deterrence of potential adversaries in the mode of the Cold War Active 
Defense and AirLand Battle doctrines.  This role is predicated on the army maintaining a 
credible capability to, “fight and win across the full spectrum of conflict.”  The “Shape” 
role refers to the development of capabilities of allied militaries through training and 
partnering missions to keep enemies contained.  This role was intentionally removed 
from the army repertoire after the Vietnam War and until the Iraq War only Special 
Forces concerned themselves with “Foreign Internal Defense.”301 The final role of “Win” 
is the traditional army mission of conventional, high-intensity combat.  This combination 
of Cold War deterrence, foreign military training skills developed in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and traditional state-on-state war is perhaps an attempt by Odierno to steer a 
middle course through the demands of the President’s new defense strategy, the 
experience of young Iraq and Afghanistan War veterans, and the concerns of 
conservative army traditionalists.302   
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 Furthermore, as revealed by Colonel Paul Yingling’s indictment of the general 
officer corps in A Failure in Generalship, the rank-and-file officer corps has not blamed 
politicians or the general public for the failures of the Iraq War as was the case after 
Vietnam, but has directed its criticism at the performance of the army’s governing class 
of generals.   This final factor may be the most significant of the differences between the 
post Vietnam and Iraq eras.  Unlike the lessons drawn from Vietnam by officers such as 
Colin Powell, that were directed externally, many officers have focused their attention 
internally.  The long-term stability of the Iraqi state, the endgame in Afghanistan, and 
budget battles in Washington, D.C. will all shape the debate over the lessons learned and 
the narrative of the post Iraq War era; however, without, clearer alignment among the 
external political environment, the service philosophy, and its interpretation of the past, a 
new or modified dominant narrative may not emerge for some time.   
 It should not be surprising that the post Vietnam narrative has been difficult to 
overturn, as it has been institutionalized over a period of thirty years and appeals to deep 
historical traditions in army culture. While this narrative is powerful, it is clearly open to 
reinterpretation by the current generation of officers forged in the Iraq and Afghanistan 
wars.  Perhaps not since World War II has a generation of rank-and-file officers had such 
a significant amount of combat experience relative to the general officer corps.  Unlike 
the post Vietnam War era where many senior generals like Westmoreland, Abrams, and 
DePuy all had served in World War II, the current generation of senior officers does not 
have an alternate set of experiences distinct from that of junior officers to validate its 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://m.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137432/raymond-t-odierno/the-us–army-in-a-time-of-transition  
(accessed May 3, 2012). 
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philosophy of war.303  The lack of an alternate source of experience forces senior officers 
to base arguments about the future of the army upon their own experiences in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  Since junior officers share many of these experiences, and as Yingling 
demonstrated these officers are no longer timid about questioning generals, these 
arguments are open to contestation.     
 The current generation of junior and mid-level officers and their interpretations of 
their experience will be critical in determining the future of the army.  Will they 
subscribe to the arguments of the post Vietnam narrative as Colin Powell did and reject 
the Iraq and Afghan Wars? Or is it possible that these officers, stripped of their illusions 
about their senior leaders,304 will choose their own independent path?  Regardless of how 
the dominant narrative in the post Iraq era develops, the interpretation of the past and its 
understood lessons will play a central role in the future of the culture of the U.S. Army.   
B. Long-Term Institutional Change 
 Finally, it is misleading to say that the army is a learning organization.  Tactical 
adaptation and longer term “learning” are more accurately conducted by individuals 
rather than in some abstract organizational collective.  Individuals interpret history, 
understand their reality, and plan for the future based upon their own experiences, 
                                                 
303
   General DePuy was able to validate his doctrine based upon his earlier combat experience in Western 
Europe in 1944 and 1945. Current generals do not have such a powerful experience independent of younger 
officers.  The bulk of current general officers entered in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  Their experiences 
in the Gulf War or the peacekeeping missions of the 1990s are not of sufficient scale or gravity to provide 
functional alternatives to junior officer experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan.  In the current era authoritative 
references to Operation Desert Storm as a model of war are likely to be less than persuasive with many Iraq 
and Afghanistan veterans.      
 
304
 The failure of establishment generals to deal with the challenges in Iraq in 2003-2007 and the failure of 
senior counterinsurgency advocates in 2009 to successfully apply their model to Afghanistan have served 
to undermine the moral authority of senior officers as a class to rank-and-file officers.  Woodward, 
Obama’s Wars.; and Yingling, “An Absence of Strategic Thinking.”  
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education, and personality.  Organizational philosophies emerge from shared narrative 
interpretations of past events and provide a common frame of reference for the 
organization to plan and address challenges.  These philosophies are far from static; even 
the most dominant and powerful of narratives is undergoing revision based on 
developments in the external political and security environments and reinterpretations 
over time by members of the organization.   
 However, the army is more than simply a transitory collection of individuals with 
each succeeding generation of officers starting with an organizational blank slate.  
Continuity is achieved through formal and informal structures, such as written doctrine, 
common practice, and traditions.  Powerful individuals within the institution, such as 
generals like DePuy or Petraeus, embed their interpretations of experience and history 
within the structure of the organization through formal doctrines. Watershed doctrines 
like the 1976 Active Defense or the 2006 Counterinsurgency, inform the army’s official 
philosophy of war.305  Acceptance and internalization of this philosophy of war by a 
critical mass of rank-and-file officers leads to a dominant cultural narrative forming 
within the organization.  Reinterpretation of this narrative in light of subsequent events, 
like a war, can lead to the narrative being reaffirmed or called into question.  It is 
significant to remember that the post Vietnam narrative was not simply ordered into 
existence by General DePuy.  Rank-and-file officers, like then Colonel Colin Powell, 
accepted the argument of DePuy’s narrative and institutionalized it within the army 
during their careers, especially after “proving” its validity in the Gulf War.  This 
interactive dynamic serves a critical role in the stability and coherence of a military 
                                                 
305
 The combination of common understandings of organizational purpose, legitimate combat methods, and 
legitimate types of wars to be fought. 
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organization, allowing members to make sense of a complex environment and guide their 
actions amid uncertainty.  It is when cultural narratives calcify into unquestioned and 
reactionary orthodoxy that they become counter-productive, and in combat, dangerous.   
 For the intellectual vitality and flexibility of a military institution to endure, its 
philosophy of war and cultural narrative must be constantly reexamined, questioned, and 
changed.  As the examples of the post Vietnam era and the Iraq War surge clearly 
demonstrate, change is neither achieved through the imposition of a strategy from above 
nor by tactical level innovation from below.  Thus, organizational change can be best 
understood as a long-term, ambiguous, and fundamentally interactive undertaking.  Even 
when major tactical changes are dramatically adopted during crises, these changes can be 
undermined or rolled-back by subsequent developments.  Deeply ingrained cultural 
preferences and organizational philosophies take time and constant reinterpretation to 
truly change.  External developments are critical to reaffirming or undermining this 
change, but a long term shift in an organizational culture requires a fundamental internal 
reinterpretation of the dominant narrative.     
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